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ABSTRACT 
In the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., Justice Antonin Scalia writing for a unanimous Court partially achieved his 
goal of abolishing the prudential standing doctrine.  First, the Court concluded that the zone of 
interests test concerns whether Congress has authorized a particular plaintiff to sue and is not a 
prudential standing question despite several Court decisions classifying it as such.  However, there 
is a continuing controversy in the D.C. Circuit about applying the test to suits by competitors, 
especially in environmental cases.  The better approach is to allow competitor standing in at least 
some environmental cases because even self-interested suits may advance the environmental 
purposes of the applicable statutes.  Second, the Court held that its limitations on “generalized 
grievances” suits is based on constitutional Article III standing requirements and not the 
prudential standing principles relied in some of the Court’s previous cases.  Yet it is not clear that 
treating limitations on “generalized grievances” as Article III standing requirements will preclude 
taxpayer suits, voting rights cases or climate change litigation, especially if the Court’s composition 
changes.  Finally, the Court did not resolve the issue of whether limitations on third-party standing 
are based on prudential standing or other grounds.  If the Court precludes third-party suits, 
however, it should recognize that some challengers have a sufficient personal Article III injury in 
protecting the various constitutional rights at issue in those cases, although the differing 
circumstances in various third-party standing cases likely preclude a single easy rule.  Justice 
Scalia in theory eliminated two of the three major prongs of prudential standing endorsed by the 
Court in a 2004 decision.  However, a more liberal future Supreme Court might be able to revive 
prudential standing in practice, if not name, without overruling Lexmark.
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INTRODUCTION 
Until 2014, the Supreme Court distinguished between mandatory 
Article III standing requirements2 and discretionary court-imposed 
prudential standing considerations.3  However, in a 1983 law review 
article, Justice Antonin Scalia, then a judge on the Federal Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, argued that the prudential standing 
doctrine was problematic because there was no legal basis for giving 
judges discretionary authority to reject otherwise lawful cases and that 
federal courts should abolish the doctrine to rely solely on constitu-
tional standing principles.4  In the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in 
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., Justice Scal-
ia writing for a unanimous5 Court partially achieved his goal of abol-
ishing the prudential standing doctrine.6  However, a more liberal fu-
ture Supreme Court might be able to revive prudential standing in 
practice, if not name, without overruling Lexmark.7 
 
 2 See infra Part I.A. 
 3 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004), partially abrogated by 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88 & n.3 
(2014); see infra Part I.A. 
 4 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885 (1983); see also Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of 
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First, the Lexmark decision concluded that the zone of interests 
test concerns whether Congress has authorized a particular plaintiff 
to sue and is not a prudential standing question despite several Court 
decisions classifying it as such.8  However, there is a continuing con-
troversy in the D.C. Circuit about applying the test to suits by compet-
itors, especially in environmental cases.9  The better approach is to 
allow competitor standing in at least some environmental cases be-
cause even self-interested suits may advance the environmental pur-
poses of the relevant statutes.10  Because it involves a case by case de-
termination of statutory intent, the zone of interests test formulated 
by Justice Scalia in Lexmark is likely to survive even after his departure 
from the Court, but a future Court might interpret the test more lib-
erally than Justice Scalia without overruling Lexmark.11 
 
Standing, supra note 1 at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s criticism of pru-
dential standing doctrine). 
 5 During the 2013–2014 Supreme Court term, from October 2013 through June 2014, “the 
Supreme Court justices voted unanimously in 65 percent of orally argued cases—the 
highest share since at least 1953” “and those cases revealed signs of compromise and re-
straint, which many Supreme Court specialists said was a testament to the leadership of 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.”  Adam Liptak, Compromise at the Supreme Court Veils Its 
Rifts, N.Y. Times, July 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/us/supreme-court-
term-marked-by-unanimous-decisions.html?hpw&action=click&pgtype=Homepage
&version=HpHedThumbWell&module=well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=
bottom-well&_r=0.  In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the 
Court was able to achieve unanimity in part by avoiding the controversial issue of third-
party standing.  134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3; see infra Part V. 
 6 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386–88, 1387 n.3. 
 7 See infra Parts III–V and Conclusion. 
 8 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386–88 & nn.3–4. 
 9 See infra Part IV.C. 
 10 See infra Part IV.C. 
 11 See infra  Part IV.B. 
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Second, the Court held that its limitations on “generalized griev-
ances” suits are based on constitutional Article III standing require-
ments and not the prudential standing principles relied on some of 
the Court’s previous cases.12  The prohibition against generalized 
grievances most notably bars suits based solely on a plaintiff’s status as 
a federal taxpayer,13 but also addresses other types of suits in which 
the alleged harm affects large numbers of or all American citizens or 
voters.14  Yet the Lexmark decision did not explicitly prohibit all tax-
payer suits despite Justice Scalia’s likely desire for such a result, and, 
therefore, a future Supreme Court could revive taxpayer suits in some 
circumstances.15  Furthermore, the Court could continue to allow cer-
tain suits by voters or climate change suits that a minority of the 
Court, including Justice Scalia, view as generalized grievances that are 
prohibited by Article III.16 
Finally, the Court did not resolve the issue of whether limitations 
on third-party standing are based on prudential standing or other 
grounds.17  The doctrine of third-party standing is complicated be-
cause it involves several different types of suits that cannot be easily 
treated as similar, and, therefore, there may not be a simple standing 
answer for all third-party suits.18  If the Court precludes third-party 
suits, however, it should recognize that some challengers have a suffi-
cient personal Article III injury in protecting the various constitu-
tional rights at issue to sue on their own standing in those cases.19 
Justice Scalia did not win a complete victory against prudential 
standing in Lexmark.  However, in theory he eliminated two of the 
three major prongs of prudential standing endorsed by the Court in a 
2004 decision.20  Nevertheless, a more liberal future Supreme Court 
could revive particular prudential standing practices, such as allowing 
some taxpayer suits, without overruling Lexmark, or allow more liberal 
competitor standing than is the current practice in the D.C. Circuit.21 
Part I explains the basic principles of constitutional Article III 
standing and the more controversial doctrine of prudential standing.  
 
 12 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3. 
 13 See infra Part III.A. 
 14 See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 15 See infra Part III.A. 
 16 See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 17 See infra Part V. 
 18 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12, partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386–
88, 1387 & n.3; see infra Part I.A. 
 21 See infra Parts III, IV and Conclusion. 
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Part II discusses how the Lexmark decision changed the prudential 
standing doctrine.  Part III examines the complicated history of 
whether the Supreme Court’s reluctance to hear, and partial prohibi-
tion against “generalized grievances” suits, is based on prudential 
standing principles or constitutional Article III standing require-
ments, how Lexmark squarely concluded that Article III standing doc-
trine governs the issue, and why Lexmark may not prohibit all suits 
that are arguably generalized grievances.  Part IV examines the histo-
ry of the zone of interests test, how Lexmark determined that the zone 
of interests test is not a prudential standing issue, and why Lexmark 
did not resolve the contentious issue in the D.C. Circuit regarding 
whether and when economic competitors met the zone of interests 
test.  Part V explains the Court’s usual, but not complete, prohibition 
against third-party suits, and explores how it may be possible to rec-
ognize suits by some, but not all, third parties as having a sufficient 
personal interest in the suit.  The conclusion tries to assess how signif-
icantly Lexmark changed prudential standing doctrine, and which im-
portant issues remain unresolved by that decision. 
I.  INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENTIAL STANDING22 
A.  Constitutional Article III Standing 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly require that each 
plaintiff establish “standing” to file suit in federal court, the Supreme 
Court has inferred from Article III’s restriction of judicial decisions to 
“Cases” and “Controversies” that federal courts must impose standing 
requirements to confirm that a plaintiff has a genuine interest in the 
outcome of a case.23  For a federal court to have jurisdiction over a 
 
 22 The discussion of standing in Part I relies upon my earlier standing articles cited in note 
1. 
 23 The constitutional standing requirements are derived from Article III, section 2, which 
provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies be-
tween two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State; between 
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands 
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340–41 (2006) 
(explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case and controversy re-
quirement necessitates standing limitations).  See generally Michael E. Solimine, Congress, 
Separation of Powers and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1036–38 (2009) (discuss-
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case, at least one plaintiff must demonstrate it has standing for each 
form of relief sought.24  Federal courts must dismiss a case for lack of 
jurisdiction if no plaintiff meets constitutional Article III standing re-
quirements.25 
Standing requirements are grounded in constitutional principles.  
Standing doctrine prevents unconstitutional advisory opinions.26  Ad-
ditionally, standing requirements are consistent with separation of 
powers principles delimiting the division of powers between the judi-
ciary and political branches of government so that the “Federal Judi-
ciary respects the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts 
in a democratic society.”27  Individual members of the Supreme Court 
have disagreed, however, regarding the extent to which separation of 
powers principles limit Congress’s authority to authorize standing to 
sue in federal courts for private citizen suits challenging executive 
branch decisions.28 
The Supreme Court has formulated a three-part test for constitu-
tional Article III standing that requires a plaintiff to establish that:  
(1) he has “suffered an injury-in-fact,” which is (a) “concrete and par-
ticularized” and (b) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypo-
 
ing a scholarly debate on whether the Framers intended the Constitution to require 
standing to sue). 
 24 See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351–52 (confirming that “a plaintiff must demonstrate 
standing separately for each form of relief sought” (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000))). 
 25 See id. at 340–41 (emphasizing the importance of the case or controversy requirement); 
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (adding that courts have an affirmative duty at the out-
set of the litigation to ensure that litigants satisfy all Article III standing requirements). 
 26 See Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (“Article III of the Constitution restricts 
the power of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’  Accordingly, ‘[t]o invoke the 
jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an ac-
tual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.’  Federal courts may not ‘decide questions that cannot affect the rights of liti-
gants in the case before them or give opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a 
hypothetical state of facts.’” (citations omitted)). 
 27 DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 28 Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–78 (1992) (concluding that 
Articles II and III of the Constitution limit Congress’s authority to authorize citizen suits 
by any person lacking a concrete injury and citing several recent Supreme Court deci-
sions for support), with id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to 
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before….”); id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
“principal effect” of the majority’s approach to standing was “to transfer power into the 
hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the courts—but of Congress, from which 
that power originates and emanates”).  See generally Heather Elliott, The Functions of Stand-
ing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 496 (2008) (suggesting the “disagreement” is “[u]nsurprising[]” 
and arguing that courts should not use standing doctrine as “a backdoor way to limit 
Congress’s legislative power”). 
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thetical”; (2) “there [is] a causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fair-
ly . . . trace[able]29 to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party 
not before the court”; and (3) “it [is] likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”30  
The plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all three prongs of consti-
tutional Article III standing.31 
B.  The Controversial Prudential Standing Doctrine Before Lexmark 
1.  The Court’s Pre-Lexmark Prudential Standing Doctrine 
Before the Lexmark decision in 2014, federal courts had imposed 
prudential standing considerations to limit unreasonable demands 
on limited judicial resources or for other judicial policy reasons to 
prohibit suits in federal courts even if a plaintiff met constitutional 
Article III standing requirements.32  Before its Lexmark decision, the 
Supreme Court had identified three major parts to the prudential 
standing doctrine: 
Although we have not exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of 
the standing doctrine, we have explained that prudential standing en-
compasses “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another per-
son’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances 
more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the 
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests 
protected by the law invoked.”33 
 
 29 The Lexmark decision explained the distinction between the standing requirement of fair-
ly traceable causation and the ultimate question of proving proximate causation on the 
merits as follows:  “Proximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing, which 
requires only that the plaintiff’s injury be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct.”  
Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1391 n.6. 
 30 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 31 DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must 
“carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 
(same); see also LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 336 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that a 
plaintiff at the summary judgment stage must ultimately prove the existence of injury, 
causation, and redressability). 
 32 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997) (describing the zone of interests 
standard as a “prudential limitation” rather than a mandatory constitutional require-
ment); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (stating that prudential requirements are 
based “in policy, rather than purely constitutional, considerations”); YACKLE, supra note 
31, at 318 (stating that prudential limitations are policy-based). 
 33 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 
(1984), partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377; see also S. Todd Brown, The Story of 
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Even before the Court’s Lexmark decision, however, the Court in 
some decisions had based the prohibition against generalized griev-
ances on Article III rather than prudential concerns.34  The distinc-
tion between constitutional Article III and prudential standing mat-
ters because Congress may enact legislation to override court-
imposed prudential limitations, but may not do so for constitutional 
standing requirements.35 
Prior to its Lexmark decision, the Court had been inconsistent in at 
least two decisions regarding whether the prudential standing doc-
trine was as important as constitutional Article III standing require-
ments in protecting core separation of powers principles and, there-
fore, whether prudential standing was a mandatory jurisdictional 
issue that required dismissal of a case from the federal courts if a 
plaintiff’s suit was contrary to prudential standing principles, alt-
hough the language in these two decisions is arguably dicta.36  First, 
the Court in its 1975 decision in Warth v. Seldin implied that pruden-
tial standing doctrine is crucial in preventing federal courts from ad-
dressing political questions more appropriately addressed by the po-
litical branches, but the decision did not explicitly address whether 
prudential standing is a jurisdictional issue: 
Without such limitations—closely related to Art. III concerns but essen-
tially matters of judicial self-governance—the courts would be called up-
on to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though 
 
Prudential Standing, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 95, 101, 109–15, 118–24 (2014) (discuss-
ing three main types of prudential standing used before 2014:  (1) zone of interests; (2) 
generalized grievances; and (3) third-party standing; but observing courts have recog-
nized some other miscellaneous prudential standing issues). 
 34 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007) (“We have 
consistently held that [the interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are 
spent in accordance with the Constitution] is too generalized and attenuated to support 
Article III standing.”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 (“We have consistently held that a plain-
tiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to 
his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and 
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at 
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”); Brown, supra note 33, at 109–10 
(observing that Supreme Court originally treated generalized grievances as prudential is-
sue, but later as a constitutional issue). 
 35 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162–66 (explaining that “unlike their constitutional counterparts, 
[prudential limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by Congress,” that pruden-
tial limitations must be “expressly negated” and concluding that a citizen suit provision 
abrogated the zone of interests limitation); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra 
note 1, at 676 & n.53 (same).  The Court’s requirement that Congress use express statu-
tory language to override the Court’s prudential standing rules probably does not neces-
sitate the extraordinary specificity demanded by a clear statement rule of statutory con-
struction.  YACKLE, supra note 31, at 386 n.493. 
 36 See Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 426–29. 
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other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the 
questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to 
protect individual rights.37 
In Thompson v. County of Franklin, the Second Circuit interpreted the 
above quoted language in Warth to determine that prudential stand-
ing issues affect a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction and, ac-
cordingly, that it had a duty to sua sponte examine prudential stand-
ing issues despite the failure of the parties to raise the question.38 
Contrarily, in its 1984 decision in Allen v. Wright, the Supreme 
Court concluded that Article III standing is “perhaps the most im-
portant” of the case-or-controversy doctrines including “mootness, 
ripeness, political question, and the like.”39  The Allen decision im-
plied that Article III standing, as a “core component” of standing “de-
rived directly from the Constitution,” is a more fundamental constitu-
tional core requirement than prudential standing doctrines, stating: 
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a liti-
gant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication 
of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the repre-
sentative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall 
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.  The require-
ment of standing, however, has a core component derived directly from 
the Constitution.  A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable 
to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed 
by the requested relief.40 
In Alliance for Environmental Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., the 
Second Circuit interpreted the Allen decision as treating Article III 
standing as “[m]ore fundamental than judicially imposed, prudential 
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”41 
The Supreme Court’s pre-Lexmark prudential standing doctrine 
was arguably less clear and more open to interpretation than the Ar-
 
 37 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975), partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377. 
 38 15 F.3d 245, 248–49 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 39 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); see also Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates 
Co., 436 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing Allen v. Wright’s emphasis that Article III 
standing is the most important of the case-or-controversy doctrines). 
 40 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citation omitted); accord Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. Unit-
ed for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“[The Article III re-
quirement] states a limitation on judicial power, not merely a factor to be balanced in the 
weighing of so-called ‘prudential’ considerations.”); Alliance for Envtl. Renewal, Inc., 436 
F.3d at 85 (discussing Allen v. Wright’s suggestion that Article III standing is more im-
portant than prudential standing). 
 41 Id. 
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ticle III constitutional standing doctrine discussed earlier in Part I.A.42  
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the Supreme Court in 
2004 conceded that “we have not exhaustively defined the prudential 
dimensions of the standing doctrine.”43  In Newdow, the Court dis-
missed an Establishment Clause suit filed by the father of an elemen-
tary school student challenging the constitutionality of a school dis-
trict’s policy requiring teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of 
Allegiance because of prudential standing concerns about the appro-
priateness of federal courts “entertain[ing] a claim by a plaintiff 
whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dis-
pute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on 
the person who is the source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing.”44  
The child’s mother, who was the custodial parent, intervened in the 
suit to dismiss the complaint and disputed the father’s right to influ-
ence his daughter’s religious upbringing under California law.45  Be-
cause of these family law issues, a majority determined that the Court 
should invoke prudential standing principles to avoid a case involving 
difficult family law issues governed by California domestic relations 
law.46  In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 
who was joined by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Clarence 
Thomas, complained that the majority had created a “new prudential 
standing principle” based on “ad hoc improvisations” to dismiss a 
troublesome case and should instead formulate “general principles” 
for prudential standing.47 
Both Newdow48 and the more recent Windsor decision demonstrate 
that there were sometimes considerable disagreements on the Court 
before the Lexmark decision about how to apply prudential standing 
principles.  In its 2013 decision United States v. Windsor,49 decided just 
a year before Lexmark and with the same nine Justices serving on the 
Court, the majority opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy suggested 
the usual requirement that the parties be truly adverse in their posi-
 
 42 See Gregory Bradford, Note, Simplifying State Standing:  The Role of Sovereign Interests in Fu-
ture Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L REV. 1065, 1079 (2011) (describing prudential standing 
doctrine as “a malleable framework”). 
 43 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004). 
 44 Id. at 17. 
 45 Id. at 13–17; Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 423. 
 46 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 12–17; see also Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdic-
tional?, supra note 1, at 423. 
 47 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.,  542 U.S. at 18–25 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Mank, Is Pruden-
tial Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 423. 
 48 See Bradford, supra note 42, at 1079–80. 
 49 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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tions is a flexible prudential standing principle that can be waived in 
certain circumstances if non-parties filing amicus briefs provide suffi-
cient critical arguments.50  The Court concluded that the House of 
Representatives leadership’s amicus brief had sufficiently supported 
the constitutionality of a statute denying government benefits to same 
sex married couples to create an adverse case fit for judicial resolu-
tion despite the executive branch’s unwillingness to defend the con-
stitutionality of the statute.51  However, the dissenting opinion by Jus-
tice Scalia argued that the requirement of adverseness was instead 
mandated by constitutional Article III principles and that majority’s 
treatment of the issue as prudential in nature was motivated by issues 
of convenience so that the Court could decide the case on the merits 
and not dismiss a case in which the government and the challenger 
agreed that the statute was unconstitutional.52  Windsor involved a 
challenge to Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act53 (“DOMA”), 
which excluded same-sex married partners from numerous federal 
laws otherwise applicable to lawfully married spouses.54  In particular, 
the Court held that the United States met Article III standing be-
cause, despite its agreement with the lower court’s ruling, the United 
States had not refunded the money to which Edie Windsor was enti-
tled under that ruling and thus suffered an economic injury.55  Addi-
tionally, the Court found it appropriate to permit arguments provid-
ed in an amicus brief by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
(“BLAG”), which represented a majority of the House of Representa-
tives leaders, supporting DOMA to satisfy the prudential concerns 
that the United States and Windsor were “friendly” parties and, there-
fore, that BLAG’s participation supplied the necessary “adverseness” 
required to have a justiciable controversy suitable for resolution by 
federal courts.56 
 
 50 Id. at 2687; see also Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 422–23, 428. 
 51 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2687. 
 52 Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Relegating a jurisdictional requirement to ‘prudential’ 
status is a wondrous device, enabling courts to ignore the requirement whenever they be-
lieve it ‘prudent’—which is to say, a good idea.”). 
 53 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686. 
 56 Id. at 2687–88 (citing other cases where the Court has entertained adversarial arguments 
from nonparties). 
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2.  Criticisms of Prudential Standing Doctrine 
In a 1983 law review article authored when he was serving as a 
judge on the D.C. Circuit, now-Justice Scalia doubted the validity of 
“the so-called ‘prudential limitations of standing’ allegedly imposed 
by the Court itself, subject to elimination by the Court or by Con-
gress.”57  He questioned whether any prudential standing principles 
not based on constitutional standing are valid, asserting, “I find this 
bifurcation [between prudential and constitutional standing] unsatis-
fying—not least because it leaves unexplained the Court’s source of 
authority for simply granting or denying standing as its prudence 
might dictate.”58  Justice Scalia has followed a judicial philosophy in 
which he believes that federal courts are bound by the original intent 
of the Framers of the Constitution and may not exercise judicial au-
thority outside the scope of Article III’s provisions.59  In his 1983 arti-
cle, he contended that the “judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial 
and inseparable element” of separation of powers principles required 
by the structure and original intent of the Constitution, which pro-
vides boundaries for the respective exercise of legislative, executive 
and judicial powers.60  Because authority for flexible prudential judi-
cial decisionmaking is not contained in Article III, then-Judge Scalia 
suggested that federal courts should eliminate prudential standing 
doctrine and hear all cases for which there is constitutional standing:  
“as I would prefer to view the matter, the Court must always hear the 
 
 57 See Scalia, supra note 4, at 885; see also Brown, supra note 33, at 128–33 (arguing courts 
should abolish prudential standing doctrine because federal courts have duty to hear all 
cases for which they have constitutional standing jurisdiction); Mank, Judge Posner’s “Prac-
tical” Theory of Standing, supra note 1, at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s 
criticism of prudential standing doctrine). 
 58 Scalia, supra note 4, at 885. 
 59 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 44.47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law 
Courts in a Civil-Law System] (supporting an originalist approach to constitutional inter-
pretation); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851–62 
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism] (defending originalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation but acknowledging some difficulties); see also Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practi-
cal” Theory of Standing, supra note 1, at 105–06 (discussing Justice Scalia’s approach to con-
stitutional originalism, including that he is a “fainthearted originalist” who acknowledges 
that originalist principles may have to yield in some cases to pragmatic concerns about 
adhering to longstanding judicial precedent). 
 60 Scalia, supra note 4, at 881; see also Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing, supra 
note 1, at 104. 
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case of a litigant who asserts the violation of a legal right.”61  Before 
the Lexmark decision, Justice Scalia did not directly call for the aboli-
tion of prudential standing,62 but in cases where the line between 
constitutional and prudential standing is questionable, he prefers to 
categorize issues as constitutional standing rather than prudential.63  
In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., Justice Scalia in his 
concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Thomas, contended 
that the Court should overrule its 1968 decision in Flast v. Cohen,64 
which suggested that the prohibition against taxpayer standing is 
prudential rather than constitutional,65 and clearly declare that the 
bar against taxpayer standing is constitutional and not just pruden-
tial.66 
Besides Justice Scalia, other commentators have made various crit-
icisms of the Court’s prudential standing doctrines.  Some commen-
tators have argued that the line separating constitutional Article III 
standing doctrine from prudential standing doctrine is often murky.67  
For example, as is discussed in Part III, the Court for many years did 
not clearly explain whether the general prohibition against taxpayer 
suits was a principle based on prudential standing doctrine or consti-
tutional Article III principles.68  Furthermore, Dean Erwin Chemerin-
sky has contended that the Court sometimes manipulates arbitrary 
distinctions between constitutional Article III standing and pruden-
 
 61 Scalia, supra note 4, at 885; see also Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing, supra 
note 1, at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s criticism of prudential standing 
doctrine). 
 62 Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing, supra note 1, at 106–07 (discussing Jus-
tice Scalia’s 1983 article’s criticism of prudential standing doctrine). 
 63 Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, supra note 1, at 425. 
 64 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 65 Id. at 92–94; Solimine, supra note 23, at 1042 (suggesting that Flast v. Cohen interpreted 
the Frothingham decision generally prohibiting taxpayer suits as a prudential rather than 
constitutional standing case). 
 66 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618–37, 634 n.5 (2007); accord 
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449–50 (2011) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (reiterating his view in Hein that the Court should overrule Flast and reject tax-
payer standing on constitutional grounds); see also Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdic-
tional?, supra note 1, at 425; Solimine, supra note 23, at 1045. 
 67 Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 692 (1990) 
(arguing that the Court’s distinction between prudential and constitutional standing is 
often arbitrary); see Brown, supra note 33, at 96–97, 108–15, 124–27 (2014) (same); Craig 
A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein:  Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a Pru-
dential Test of Federal Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2008) (argu-
ing that the Court sometimes shifts line between prudential and constitutional standing, 
especially in generalized grievances cases); see also Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdiction-
al?, supra note 1, at 423–33. 
 68 See infra Part III. 
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tial standing for its convenience to reach desired policy results with-
out any genuine logical basis.69  A recent possible example of the ma-
nipulation of standing doctrine to achieve policy results is the Windsor 
majority’s treatment of adverseness as a prudential rather than a con-
stitutional Article III requirement because of its desire to have the 
Supreme Court quickly resolve the question of DOMA’s constitution-
ality.70  In light of the Lexmark decision, Professor Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr. has argued that rather than explicitly invoke controversial pruden-
tial considerations to authorize or avoid considering certain cases, 
some Justices might subtly alter the three-part constitutional standing 
test to achieve the same results.71 
II.  LEXMARK 
A.  Basic Facts of the Lexmark Litigation 
Lexmark sells the only type of toner72 cartridges that work with the 
company’s laser printers; however, “remanufacturers” acquire and re-
furbish used Lexmark cartridges to sell in competition with 
Lexmark’s own new and refurbished ones.73  To discourage its cus-
tomers from dealing with remanufacturers, Lexmark’s “Prebate” pro-
gram gives customers a discount on new cartridges if they agree to re-
turn empty cartridges to the company.74  To enforce the Prebate 
terms, Lexmark inserts into each Prebate cartridge a microchip that 
disables the empty cartridge unless Lexmark replaces the chip.75 
 
 69 Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 692 (“The only apparent answer sounds terribly cynical: a 
requirement is constitutional if the Court says it is, and it is prudential if the Court says it 
is that.  Nothing in the content of the doctrines explains their constitutional or pruden-
tial status.”); but see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975) (explaining reasoning 
for prudential rules against third-party standing and generalized grievance), partially abro-
gated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377. 
 70 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2701 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 71 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1106–07 (2015) 
(“Notwithstanding the Court’s evident unease in Lexmark with formal recognition of a 
prudential element in standing doctrine, grounds for suspicion remain that ad hoc pres-
sures to authorize or withhold adjudication on the merits may encourage some of the Jus-
tices to draw finer distinctions than they would draw otherwise—including finer distinc-
tions than they might think appropriate in applying other doctrines—in determining 
whether the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability requirements are met.”). 
 72 Toner is the powdery ink that laser printers use to create images on paper.  Lexmark, 134 
S. Ct. at 1383. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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Static Control, a maker and seller of components for the remanu-
facture of Lexmark cartridges, developed a microchip that mimicked 
the microchip in Lexmark’s Prebate cartridges and therefore allowed 
remanufacturers “to refurbish and resell used Prebate cartridges.”76  
Lexmark sued Static Control for copyright infringement, but Static 
Control counterclaimed, alleging that Lexmark engaged in false or 
misleading advertising in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,77 
and that its misrepresentations had caused Static Control lost sales 
and damage to its business reputation.78  The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted Lexmark’s motion 
to dismiss Static Control’s Lanham Act counterclaim, holding that 
Static Control lacked prudential standing to bring the Lanham Act 
claim.79  The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Static Control’s 
Lanham Act claim, but acknowledged that various federal court of 
appeals had adopted three competing approaches to determining 
whether a plaintiff has standing to sue under the Lanham Act.80  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “the appropriate analyti-
cal framework for determining a party’s standing to maintain an ac-
tion for false advertising under the Lanham Act.”81 
B.  Prudential Standing in Lexmark 
While both parties had focused on the issue of prudential stand-
ing as the central issue in the case, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
questioned whether the very “label” of prudential standing was “mis-
leading.”82  The Court initially concluded that “Static Control’s allega-
tions of lost sales and damage to its business reputation give it stand-
ing under Article III to press its false-advertising claim.”83  Justice 
Scalia then observed that Lexmark’s contention that the Court 
should nevertheless dismiss Static Control’s claim on prudential 
standing grounds was “in some tension with our recent reaffirmation 
of the principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide 
cases within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.”84  The Court 
acknowledged that in prior cases it had recognized prudential stand-
 
 76 Id. at 1384. 
 77 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 78 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1384–85. 
 79 Id. at 1385. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013) (No. 12–873). 
 82 Id. at 1386. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386 (quoting another source) (interal quotation marks omitted). 
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ing doctrine as including the prohibition against third-party suits, the 
rule against generalized grievance suits and the zone of interests 
test.85 
Static Control argued that the Court should use the zone of inter-
ests test in deciding any prudential standing issues in the case.86  
While conceding that it had treated the test as a prudential standing 
question in prior cases, the Court determined that the zone of inter-
ests test is not truly a prudential issue.87  Instead, Justice Scalia ob-
served, “Whether a plaintiff comes within the zone of interests is an 
issue that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action en-
compasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.”88  The Court favorably quot-
ed the view of Judge Laurence Silberman from the D.C. Circuit that 
“prudential standing is a misnomer as applied to the zone-of-interests 
analysis, which asks whether this particular class of persons ha[s] a 
right to sue under this substantive statute.”89 
In a footnote, the Court observed that “[t]he zone-of-interests test 
is not the only concept that we have previously classified as an aspect 
of ‘prudential standing’ but for which, upon closer inspection, we 
have found that label inapt.”90  As an example, as will be further ex-
amined in Part III, the Court discussed how it had gradually moved 
from treating its reluctance to hear generalized grievances from be-
ing a prudential reservation to an Article III prohibition.91  The Court 
acknowledged that “[t]he limitations on third-party standing are 
harder to classify” as being prudential in nature or based on other 
grounds; Part V will explore whether those limitations are based on 
prudential principles.92 
 
 85 Id. (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)). 
 86 Id. at 1387. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 89 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see infra Part IV (discussing recent 
debate in the D.C. Circuit about the zone of interests test). 
 90 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3. 
 91 Id.; see infra Part III (discussing the Supreme Court’s evolution in explaining its reluc-
tance to hear generalized grievances from being a prudential principle to an Article III 
mandate). 
 92 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3; see infra Part V (discussing the Supreme Court’s divided 
jurisprudence on whether limitations on third-party standing are prudential in nature or 
based on other grounds). 
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C.  The Zone of Interests in General and in Lexmark 
After explaining that the zone of interests test did not belong with 
the prudential standing doctrine, the Court next addressed how the 
zone of interests test applied in Lexmark and how the test generally 
determines whether a plaintiff is authorized to sue in the federal 
courts.93  Justice Scalia reasoned that the central issue in Lexmark was 
whether “Static Control falls within the class of plaintiffs whom Con-
gress has authorized to sue under § 1125(a).  In other words, we ask 
whether Static Control has a cause of action under the statute.”94  In a 
footnote, the Court explained why treating the zone of interests test 
as a question of “statutory standing” and “as effectively jurisdictional” 
was “misleading,” even though some prior cases had used that label.95  
Justice Scalia reasoned:  “That label is an improvement over the lan-
guage of ‘prudential standing,’ since it correctly places the focus on 
the statute.  But it, too, is misleading, since the absence of a valid (as 
opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-
matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.”96 
Next the Court addressed how the zone of interests test affected 
whether Static Control could sue under § 1125(a).97  Only those 
plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected by 
the statute invoked, in this case § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, may 
use that statute to sue in the federal courts.98  While the Court has 
adopted a broad definition of the zone of interests for suits pursuant 
to the federal Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),99 the Lanham 
Act explicitly limits itself to false-advertising cases alleging an injury to 
a commercial interest in reputation or sales.100  Additionally, the 
Court concluded that the Lanham Act is limited to those plaintiffs 
who can establish that their injuries are proximately caused by a de-
fendant’s violation of the statute.101  The Court held that “direct ap-
plication of the zone-of-interests test and the proximate-cause re-
quirement supplies the relevant limits on who may sue” under § 
 
 93 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386–89. 
 94 Id. at 1387. 
 95 Id. at 1387 n.4. 
 96 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 97 Id. at 1388–89. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388–89 (discussing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et 
seq.). 
100 Id. at 1389–90. 
101 Id. at 1390–91. 
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1125(a).102  Addressing whether Static Control’s false-advertising 
claim was within the scope of the statute, the Court concluded that 
Static Control had met the zone of interests test for the Lanham Act 
by alleging an injury to a commercial interest in lost sales and dam-
age to its business reputation that were allegedly proximately caused 
by Lexmark’s misrepresentations.103  The Court cautioned that it was 
only addressing whether Static Control’s allegations were sufficient to 
sue pursuant to § 1125(a) and that it still had to provide evidence of 
actual injury by Lexmark at a trial.104 
III.  WHETHER THE USUAL RULE AGAINST GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES IS 
A PRUDENTIAL OR ARTICLE III BARRIER AND HOW BROAD IS THE 
BARRIER105 
A.  Taxpayer Suits Are Usually Prohibited Because They Are Generalized 
Grievances, But Lexmark Fails to Prohibit All Taxpayer Suits 
During the 1920s, before it had explicitly formulated its Article III 
standing doctrine,106 the Court in Frothingham v. Mellon held that an 
individual taxpayer generally cannot sue the government to chal-
lenge how tax dollars are appropriated because his generalized inter-
est in government funds “is shared with millions of others; is compar-
atively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future 
taxation, of any payment out of the funds, [is] so remote, fluctuating 
and uncertain.”107  In its subsequent Flast v. Cohen decision,108 which 
allowed a narrow exception for taxpayer suits where federal taxpayers 
sued to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds for the purchase of 
textbooks and other instructional materials for use in parochial 
schools on the ground that such expenditures were prohibited by Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment,109 the Court acknowl-
edged that the Frothingham decision could be read to rely on either 
constitutional Article III or prudential standing doctrine to deny 
standing, but the Flast decision preferred to read Frothingham as using 
 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 1393–95. 
104 Id. at 1395. 
105 My discussion of the Akins, Massachusetts, and AEP decisions in Part III is based in part on 
my prior work cited in note 1. 
106 See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating explicitly the Article III standing 
requirement in a Supreme Court case for the first time). 
107 262 U.S. 447, 486–89 (1923). 
108 392 U.S. 83, 92–94 (1968). 
109 Id. at 102–06. 
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prudential or policy reasons to deny taxpayer standing.110  For many 
years, before Lexmark classified the usual prohibition against general 
grievance suits as an Article III standing barrier,111 the Court failed to 
clearly explain whether the general prohibition against taxpayer suits 
was based on constitutional or prudential considerations,112 although 
recent Court decisions had emphasized constitutional barriers to tax-
payer standing.113  In his Hein concurrence, Justice Scalia contended 
that the Court should overrule Flast and hold that the rule against 
taxpayer standing is based upon constitutional standing doctrine and 
not just prudential factors.114  While the Lexmark decision held that 
the barrier against all generalized grievances, including presumably 
taxpayer suits, is based on Article III grounds and not prudential con-
siderations,115 the decision did not explicitly prohibit all taxpayer suits 
and thus did not clearly adopt Justice Scalia’s goal in his Hein concur-
rence of overruling Flast.116 
The Lexmark decision’s failure to prohibit all taxpayer suits might 
make a difference in future tax expenditure suits.  In Arizona Christian 
School Tuition Organization v. Winn,117 the Court, in a five to four deci-
sion written by Justice Kennedy, distinguished Flast and held that Ari-
zona taxpayers lacked Article III standing to bring an action alleging 
that an Arizona statute that granted tuition tax credits to income tax-
payers who contributed money to “student tuition organizations” 
(“STO”) that used the contributions to provide scholarships to stu-
dents attending private schools, including religious schools, violated 
 
110 Id. at 92–94; see Solimine, supra note 23, at 1042 (suggesting that Flast v. Cohen interpreted 
the Frothingham decision as a prudential rather than constitutional standing case). 
111 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3. 
112 Anne Abramowitz, A Remedy for Every Right:  What Federal Courts Can Learn From California’s 
Taxpayer Standing, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1595, 1605–07 (2010). 
113 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441–49 (2011) (discussing 
Article III barriers to taxpayer standing); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 
551 U.S. 587, 634 n.5 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that the 
Court “has occasionally in dicta described the prohibition on generalized grievances as 
merely a prudential bar,” but explaining that the doctrine “squarely rest[s] on Article III 
considerations, as the analysis in Lujan . . . confirms[]”); DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 
344 (refusing to create an exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing for 
challenges to state tax or spending decisions, and observing that taxpayer standing has 
been rejected “because the alleged injury is not ‘concrete and particularized,’ but instead 
a grievance the taxpayer ‘suffers in some indefinite way in common with people’”) (cita-
tion omitted). 
114 Hein, 551 U.S. at 618–37, 634 n.5; Solimine, supra note 23, at 1045. 
115 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3. 
116 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 618–37, 634 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring); infra notes 117–20 and ac-
companying text (discussing Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn and its 
implications in future cases). 
117 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
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the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.118  The majority distin-
guished the Flast decision on the grounds that the former case in-
volved actual expenditures by the government that arguably promot-
ed religious organizations, but the Arizona statute did not cause any 
injury to state taxpayers.  Because Arizona was merely declining to 
impose a tax, rather than making an expenditure, any financial injury 
to the plaintiff taxpayers was speculative, and any injuries to taxpayers 
were not fairly traceable to the State, as the tax credit system was im-
plemented by private action and with no State intervention.119  In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, who was joined by Justice Thomas, 
reiterated his view in his Hein concurrence that the Court should 
overrule Flast and reject taxpayer standing on constitutional 
grounds.120  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Elena Kagan, who was 
joined by Justices Ruth Ginsberg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia So-
tomayor, argued that Flast and subsequent cases authorized state tax-
payers to bring Establishment Clause challenges to the Arizona stat-
ute because otherwise legislatures could use tax expenditures to 
achieve the same unconstitutional support for religion that they may 
not achieve directly through expenditures.121 
While Justice Scalia’s classification of generalized grievances as an 
Article III limitation is inconsistent with the prudential implications 
of the Flast decision, the Lexmark decision did not explicitly overrule 
Flast or prohibit all taxpayer suits.122  A future Supreme Court could 
overrule its decision in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization 
without overruling the Lexmark decision.  Thus, the Lexmark deci-
sion’s classification of generalized grievances as an Article III limita-
tion did not completely vindicate Justice Scalia’s argument in his Hein 
 
118 Id. at 1442–49. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1449–50 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
121 Id. at 1450–63 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
122 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–88, 1387 n.3 (2014).  It is possible that the Flast decision still 
survives as a narrow Establishment Clause exception to the general rule that Article III 
standing principles prohibit taxpayer suits, but Flast’s prudential approach to taxpayer 
suits is clearly inconsistent with Lexmark’s categorization of the usual prohibition of gen-
eralized grievances as arising from Article III.  Compare id. (stating usual prohibition of 
generalized grievances is based on Article III and not on prudential factors) with Flast, 
392 U.S. at 92–94 (suggesting that the Frothingham decision’s prohibition of taxpayer suits 
was based on prudential rather than constitutional standing principles).  See also Soli-
mine, supra note 23, at 1042 (suggesting that Flast v. Cohen interpreted the Frothingham 
decision as a prudential rather than constitutional standing case). 
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concurrence of barring all taxpayer suits as unconstitutional under 
Article III.123 
B.  The Prohibition Against Generalized Grievances Not Involving Taxpayer 
Suits 
In addition to the controversy over whether the usual prohibition 
against taxpayer suits was based on prudential or constitutional con-
siderations, before the Lexmark decision the Supreme Court had been 
unclear regarding whether its restriction on non-taxpayer suits alleg-
ing “generalized grievances,”124 a term which courts sometimes use to 
refer to suits involving large proportions of American citizens or vot-
ers or to suits where a litigant who has no personal injury seeks to re-
quire the government to obey a duly enacted law, was a prudential 
standing limitation or an Article III constitutional one.125  In Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,126 for example, 
the Supreme Court concluded that a court could deny standing in a 
suit involving generalized harms to large numbers of the public be-
cause such a suit would raise “general prudential concerns ‘about the 
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic so-
ciety.’”127  In its subsequent Public Citizen v. United States Department of 
 
123 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 618–37, 634 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring); supra notes 117–20 and ac-
companying text (discussing Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn and its 
implications in future cases). 
124 Courts have failed to precisely define what constitutes a “generalized grievance.”  YACKLE, 
supra note 31, at 342 (“The ‘generalized grievance’ formulation is notoriously ambigu-
ous.”); Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt:  Generalized Grievances as a Limita-
tion to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1884–92 (1996) (“Beyond the uncertainty 
about whether generalized grievances are constitutional or prudential limitations, there is 
also uncertainty about their precise definition.”). 
125 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 634 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that the 
Court “has occasionally in dicta described the prohibition on generalized grievances as 
merely a prudential bar,” but explaining that the doctrine “squarely rest[s] on Article III 
considerations, as the analysis in Lujan . . . confirms”); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 
439 (2007) (implying that the ban on generalized grievance suits is an Article III limita-
tion and citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 for that principle); YACKLE, supra note 31, at 
342–44 (discussing the debate in the Supreme Court regarding whether the rule against 
generalized grievances is a constitutional rule or non-constitutional policy waivable by 
Congress); Mank, States Standing, supra note 1, at 1710–15 (discussing confusion over 
whether the Court’s standing cases prohibiting generalized grievances are constitutional 
or prudential limitations); Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra 
note 1, at 878. 
126 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
127 Id. at 80 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), partially abrogated by Lexmark, 
134 S. Ct. 1377); see also Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 
21–22 (2005). 
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Justice128 decision, however, the Court appeared to apply a different 
view than the Duke Power decision of what constitutes a generalized 
grievance shared by many other citizens in determining that a citizen 
may assert an injury if the government denies a legitimate request for 
information even if many other citizens could request that same in-
formation.129  The Court stated: 
The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same 
complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure under FACA [Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act] does not lessen appellants’ asserted injury, 
any more than the fact that numerous citizens might request the same in-
formation under the Freedom of Information Act entails that those who 
have been denied access do not possess a sufficient basis to sue.130 
The Public Citizen decision did not discuss Duke Power’s rejection of 
suits asserting generalized grievances.131  Before Lexmark, the Court 
had never clearly defined the term “generalized grievance,” or 
whether the bar against such suits is a flexible judicial prudential doc-
trine or a firmer constitutional rule, and some of its decisions regard-
ing general grievances were arguably contradictory.132 
In Federal Election Commission v. Akins,133 the government argued 
that the plaintiffs, who sought information from the Federal Election 
Commission because the information allegedly could assist their vot-
ing decisions, should not have standing because they had endured 
only a generalized grievance similar to all other voters.134  The Court 
rejected the government’s contention that the informational injury to 
the plaintiffs was too abstract or generalized to constitute a concrete 
injury or violated judicially imposed prudential norms against gener-
alized grievances because the statute explicitly authorized the right of 
voters to request information from the Commission and, accordingly, 
superseded any prudential standing restrictions against generalized 
grievances.135  The Court distinguished prior cases imposing pruden-
tial limitations against generalized grievances by reasoning that it 
would deny standing for widely shared, generalized injuries only if 
the harm is both widely shared and also of “an abstract and indefinite 
 
128 491 U.S. 440 (1989). 
129 Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 878–79. 
130 Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–50. 
131 See id. at 440–89. 
132 See YACKLE, supra note 31, at 342 (“The generalized grievance formulation is notoriously 
ambiguous.”); Solimine, supra note 23, at 1027 (same). 
133 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
134 Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 879. 
135 Akins, 524 U.S. at 13–21; Kimberly N. Brown, What’s Left Standing? FECA Citizen Suits and 
the Battle for Judicial Review, 55 KAN. L. REV. 677, 678 (2007); Mank, Standing and Statistical 
Persons, supra note 1, at 717. 
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nature—for example, harm to the ‘common concern for obedience 
to law.’”136  Akins distinguished between legitimate concrete injuries 
and mere abstract harms in defining when large numbers of people 
may appropriately sue and meet Article III standing principles.137  
The Court reasoned that “often the fact that an interest is abstract 
and the fact that it is widely shared go hand in hand.  But their asso-
ciation is not invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though widely 
shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact.’”138  Accordingly, the Akins 
decision determined that a plaintiff who suffers a concrete, actual in-
jury may sue even though numerous other members of the American 
public have suffered similar injuries: 
[T]he fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an 
injury is widely shared . . . does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an 
interest for Article III purposes . . . .  This conclusion seems particularly 
obvious where (to use a hypothetical example) large numbers of individ-
uals suffer the same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort), or 
where large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights con-
ferred by law.139 
In his dissenting opinion in Akins, however, Justice Scalia, joined 
by Justices O’Connor and Thomas, contended that Article III stand-
ing principles bar even “concrete” generalized grievances because the 
Court has required plaintiffs to prove a “particularized” injury that 
“‘affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way’” and has de-
nied standing for all asserted injuries that are “undifferentiated and 
common to all members of the public.”140  Because the Akins plain-
tiffs’ alleged informational injury was an “undifferentiated” general-
ized grievance that was “‘common to all members of the public,’” Jus-
tice Scalia asserted that they must resolve it “by political, rather than 
judicial, means.”141  
 
136 Akins, 524 U.S. at 23 (citation omitted).  At the time of the Akins decision in 1998, the 
Supreme Court had not been clear on whether generalized grievances pose a constitu-
tional or prudential barrier to standing, and the issue has been subject to much debate.  
Solimine, supra note 23, at 1027 n.14.  The Akins decision implied that the rule against 
generalized grievances is only prudential in nature, but did not explicitly decide the issue.  
See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 
717 (discussing Akins as treating generalized grievances as prudential rule). 
137 Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717. 
138 Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (citing Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–50); Mank, Standing and Statistical 
Persons, supra note 1, at 717. 
139 Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717. 
140 Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719. 
141 Akins, 524 U.S. at 35–36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719. 
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 For broader reasons of judicial philosophy, Justice Scalia argued 
in Akins that Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement must be 
narrowly construed to exclude generalized grievances to avoid inter-
fering with the President’s Article II authority to “‘take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.’”142 
It is noteworthy that Justice Scalia’s Lexmark decision commanded 
a unanimous majority.143  Three Justices who joined his Lexmark opin-
ion were in the majority in Akins: Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer.144  It is possible that each of these three Justices has changed 
his or her mind and now agrees with Justice Scalia’s dissenting opin-
ion in Akins.  For example, subsequent to Akins, the Court, in an 
unanimous per curiam decision in Lance v. Coffman, held that four 
Colorado voters lacked standing to challenge a redistricting plan for 
congressional districts in the state because their suit was a generalized 
grievance, since they had no greater interest than any other member 
of the public in how the law was enforced and implied that the pro-
hibition was based on constitutional standing grounds.145  The Lance 
decision distinguished other voter suits, but did not mention the con-
troversial Akins decision, which involved different facts than Lance.146 
It is more likely, however, that these three Justices joined 
Lexmark’s holding that the usual prohibition against general griev-
ances is an Article III limitation147 while taking the same view in Akins 
that voter suits in a factually similar case are either not generalized 
grievances or are an exception to the rule prohibiting such suits.148  
Because Akins implied but did not decide that the usual prohibition 
against generalized grievances was prudential in nature,149 Justice 
Scalia has achieved some success in convincing three Justices in the 
majority of Akins to join his unanimous Lexmark decision treating all 
generalized grievances as involving Article III standing principles.150  
 
142 Akins, 524 U.S. at 35–37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); Mank, 
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 719. 
143 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1383. 
144 Akins, 524 U.S. at 13. 
145 Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439–42 (2007) (implying that ban on generalized griev-
ance suits is Article III limitation and citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 for that principle). 
146 Id. at 442 (“It is quite different from the sorts of injuries alleged by plaintiffs in voting 
rights cases where we have found standing.” (citation omitted)). 
147 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3. 
148 Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25. 
149 See id.; accord Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 1, at 717 (discussing Akins as 
treating generalized grievances as prudential rule). 
150 Compare Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1383 (unanimous decision including Justices Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer) with Akins, 524 U.S. at 13 (listing Justices Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer in majority and Justice Scalia and Thomas in dissent). 
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Yet Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer could still achieve the 
same result in Akins without disagreeing with Lexmark by treating the 
voters’ suit in the former case as either not a generalized grievance 
because it involves a concrete injury or as an exception to the usual 
prohibition against generalized grievance suits because of the policy 
importance of allowing voters to obtain information from the gov-
ernment that could assist their voting decisions.151 
C.  Climate Change Suits By States May Not Be Generalized Grievances 
Another important area where the Court may disagree about 
whether a suit is a generalized grievance are suits involving climate 
change, especially suits brought by state governments.  In Massachu-
setts v. EPA,152 the Court held that a state government had Article III 
standing to sue the federal government for its failure to regulate 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions from motor vehicles that argua-
bly cause global climate change, despite the highly diffuse and gener-
alized nature of the harms involved because states are “entitled to 
special solicitude in our standing analysis.”153  In American Electric Pow-
er Co. v. Connecticut (AEP),154 the Supreme Court, by an equally divid-
ed vote, affirmed a Second Circuit decision concluding that both 
state and private plaintiffs had standing in a tort action seeking GHG 
reductions from five defendants, who constituted the largest electric 
power utilities emitting GHGs in the United States.155  The Court stat-
ed, “Four members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs 
have Article III standing under Massachusetts, which permitted a State 
to challenge the [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)] re-
fusal to regulate [GHG] emissions; and, further, that no other 
threshold obstacle bars review.”156  The Court did not discuss whether 
the “some” plaintiffs included only state plaintiffs or also private 
 
151 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25 (treating the government’s denial of information to voter 
plaintiffs as a concrete injury in fact because it could affect their voting decisions). 
152 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
153 Id. at 518–21 (pointing out that Massachusetts owned a large portion of the affected terri-
tory, reinforcing the conclusion that the injury to the state was sufficiently concrete); see 
also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1528. 
154 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 
1, at 1528. 
155 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534–35 (rejecting the petitioners’ argument that the 
federal courts lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the case). 
156 Id. at 2535 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties 
in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 873, 894 (highlighting that the Court “took [an] 
unusual step” when it explained that it was equally divided on the standing and jurisdic-
tional issues). 
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plaintiffs, but some commentators have suggested that the four Jus-
tices may have decided only that the state plaintiffs had standing.157  
The Massachusetts decision did not decide whether private parties 
have standing rights to bring climate change suits against the federal 
government or large private GHG emitters.  However, the Court im-
plied that private parties may have lesser standing rights when it an-
nounced that “[i]t is of considerable relevance that the party seeking 
review here is a sovereign State and not, as it was in [Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife158], a private individual.”159 
In his Massachusetts majority opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens re-
lied upon the Court’s 1907 decision in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper 
Co.,160 in which the Court held that Georgia had standing to sue in fa-
vor of its citizens to protect them from out-of-state air pollution cross-
ing the state’s border because of the state’s quasi-sovereign parens pa-
triae interests in its natural resources and the health of its citizens.161  
He also declared that the Court had for many years “recognized that 
States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal 
jurisdiction.”162  Justice Stevens reasoned that “[j]ust as Georgia’s in-
dependent interest ‘in all the earth and air within its domain’ sup-
ported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ 
well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today.”163  Fur-
thermore, Justice Stevens concluded that the Court should recognize 
greater standing rights for states because they had ceded three im-
portant sovereign rights to the U.S. government:  (1) states may not 
use military force; (2) states are constitutionally prohibited from ne-
gotiating treaties with foreign governments; and (3) state laws are 
sometimes preempted by federal law.164  Because states have surren-
dered these three sovereign powers to the federal government, the 
 
157 See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, ‘American Electric Power’ Leaves Open Many Questions for Cli-
mate Litigation, N.Y.L.J., July 14, 2011, http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/
documents/Arnold&PorterLLP_NewYorkLawJournal_Gerrard_7.14.11.pdf; see also Mank, 
Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 873, 897–98 (pointing 
out that the ambiguity in the opinion makes it unclear whether the four Justices were also 
approving standing for private plaintiffs in climate change cases). 
158 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
159 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming 
Cases, supra note 1, at 871, 881–82 (summarizing the Court’s view that states are “not 
normal litigants” for standing purposes because they have a “quasi-sovereign interest in 
the health and welfare of their citizens”). 
160 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
161 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19 (citing Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237); see also Mank, 
No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1536–37. 
162 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518. 
163 Id. at 519. 
164 Id.; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1537–38. 
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Court applied the common law parens patriae doctrine165 to retain a 
special role for the states in a federal system of government by ac-
knowledging that states can sue in federal court to protect their qua-
si-sovereign interest in the health, welfare, and natural resources of 
their citizens.166 
In his dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, Chief Justice John Rob-
erts, who was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and 
Samuel Alito, implied that the global problem of climate change was 
a nonjusticiable general grievance that should be decided by the po-
litical branches rather than by the courts.167  Disagreeing with the ma-
jority’s interpretation that states possess special standing rights in 
climate change cases, he argued that it was inappropriate for the 
Court to apply a broader standing test for states because there was no 
precedent, statute, or reason to justify giving states broader standing 
rights.168  Notably, he argued that states do not have greater standing 
rights under the parens patriae principles because Tennessee Copper only 
recognized that states enjoy greater remedies than private litigants 
and did not address the then developing doctrine of standing.169  
While suggesting that states and private parties should have approxi-
mately similar standing rights,170 Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting 
opinion rejected the entire field of GHG litigation by either private 
parties or states because such suits are generalized grievances.171 
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that all GHG suits are general-
ized grievances regardless of whether the plaintiffs are state govern-
ments or private parties.172  He argued that the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts’ injuries from climate change failed to meet Article 
III’s injury standing requirement because the injuries were common 
 
165 See generally Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 
195 (1978) (discussing development of parens patriae doctrine in English common law to 
allow English King to act as guardian for children and mentally incompetent persons). 
166 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, 
supra note 1, at 1538. 
167 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Mank, No Article III Stand-
ing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1545. 
168 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536–40 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Mank, No Article III 
Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1543–45. 
169 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 538–39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Mank, No Article III 
Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1543. 
170 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 536–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (comparing private associa-
tions with states and asserting that, to bring a claim, both must justify that their members 
or citizens satisfy Article III standing requirements). 
171 Id. at 535–36; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 
1542–45. 
172 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535–36 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Mank, No Article III 
Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1545. 
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to the general public, and, therefore, were not “particularized” inju-
ries.173  Chief Justice Roberts also claimed that the majority’s allowing 
generalized grievance suits in climate change cases led the Court to 
interfere with the political branches of government, who should de-
cide general questions of public policy.174 
By a divided vote of four to four, the AEP decision essentially reaf-
firmed Massachusetts’ central holding that at least states may bring 
climate change suits.175  The Court stated: 
The petitioners contend that the federal courts lack authority to ad-
judicate this case.  Four members of the Court would hold that at least 
some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts, which per-
mitted a State to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate [GHG] emissions; 
and, further, that no other threshold obstacle bars review.  Four mem-
bers of the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion in Massachusetts, or 
regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of the 
plaintiffs have Article III standing.  We therefore affirm, by an equally di-
vided Court, the Second Circuit’s exercise of jurisdiction and proceed to 
the merits.176 
Four Justices concluded that at least “some” of the AEP plaintiffs met 
Article III standing requirements in light of Massachusetts.177  The 
“some” plaintiffs referred to in the AEP decision were more likely the 
state plaintiffs than the private plaintiffs in that case because the Mas-
sachusetts decision only clearly granted standing rights to state climate 
change suits.178  The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Washington Environ-
mental Council v. Bellon179 interpreted both the Massachusetts and the 
AEP decisions to mean that only state plaintiffs may bring GHG suits, 
and, therefore, that private plaintiffs seeking to regulate GHGs do 
not enjoy the same standing rights in such cases as state plaintiffs.180  
 
173 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 540–41; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, 
supra note 1, at 1545. 
174 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535, 548–49.; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private 
Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1545. 
175 Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2533–35; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private 
Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1553–57. 
176 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (citations omitted). 
177 Id. at 2535 & n.6; see also Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 
1553–57. 
178 See Jonathan H. Adler, The Supreme Court Disposes of a Nuisance Suit:  American Electric 
Power v. Connecticut, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 295, 309–10 (2011) (suggesting the four 
Justices in AEP who found that “at least some plaintiffs” had standing were most likely re-
ferring to the state plaintiffs); Gerrard, supra note 156 (same); see also Mank, No Article III 
Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1556 (same). 
179 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, 741 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2014). 
180 Id. at 1146 n.8; Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1572–73.  
See generally Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. at 2532, 2535 (reasoning, based on Massachusetts, 
that at least “some plaintiffs” had standing because three of the plaintiffs were states). 
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However, in an opinion dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of 
en banc review in Washington Environmental Council, three circuit 
judges criticized the panel decision’s denial of standing to private 
parties in GHG suits.181 
Even if private climate change suits are barred, it is improbable 
that the majority in Massachusetts or the four Justices in AEP who sup-
ported standing for “some plaintiffs” are likely to re-think their votes 
in light of Lexmark’s holding that generalized grievance suits are usu-
ally barred by Article III standing doctrine.  Justices supporting cli-
mate change suits can argue that suits by states are not generalized 
grievances because states suffer concrete injuries when their beaches 
erode as a result of rising sea levels caused by climate change.182  Al-
ternatively, they can reason that there is an exception to the general-
ized grievance doctrine when states protect their quasi-sovereign 
parens patriae interest in the health of their citizens and in their natu-
ral resources.183 
IV.  ZONE OF INTERESTS 
A.  Pre-Lexmark Cases Treat the Zone of Interests as Prudential 
Before Lexmark, the Supreme Court treated the zone of interests 
test as a prudential standing barrier.184  To insure a plaintiff has an 
appropriate statutory or constitutional interest in a suit, “a plaintiff’s 
grievence must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or 
regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee in-
voked in the suit.”185  In Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, the Supreme 
Court explained that the zone of interests inquiry seeks to include 
“reliable” plaintiffs and to “exclude those plaintiffs whose suits are 
more likely to frustrate than to further statutory objectives.”186  In 
Clarke, the Court in 1987 stated that “[t]he principal cases in which 
the ‘zone of interest’ test has been applied are those involving claims 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and the test is most 
 
181 Wash. Envtl. Council, 741 F.3d at 1079–81 (Gould, J., dissenting from denial of en banc 
review) (Judge Gould was joined by Judges Wardlaw and Paez); Mank, No Article III Stand-
ing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 1, at 1579–81. 
182 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522–23, 526. 
183 Id. at 518–20. 
184 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997) (describing the zone of interests standard 
as a prudential limitation rather than a mandatory constitutional requirement). 
185 Id. at 162. 
186 479 U.S. 388, 397 n.12 (1987); see also Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause:  Why the “Zone of Interests” Test Should Not Apply to Constitutional 
Cases, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 23, 58 (2006). 
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usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of § 702 [of the 
APA].”187  While acknowledging that the modern zone of interests test 
was originally developed “as a limitation on the cause of action for 
judicial review conferred by the Administrative Procedure Act,” the 
Lexmark decision disagreed with the premise in Clarke that the test was 
primarily concerned with APA cases and instead explained that “[w]e 
have since made clear, however, that [the zone of interests test] ap-
plies to all statutorily created causes of action; that it is a ‘require-
ment of general application’; and that Congress is presumed to ‘legis-
lat[e] against the background of’ the zone-of-interests limitation, 
‘which applies unless it is expressly negated.’”188 
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp189, the 
Court first mandated that plaintiffs suing under the APA show that 
their suit is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”190  
Disagreeing with Justice William Brennan’s dissenting opinion, which 
contended that the majority’s zone of interests test implicitly exam-
ined the merits of the case,191 Justice William Douglas in Data Pro-
cessing emphasized that the zone of interests test does not look at the 
merits, but instead is a threshold or preliminary determination sepa-
rate from whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits.192  Be-
fore the Data Processing decision, the Court in Tennessee Power Co. v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority193 had denied plaintiffs standing to sue “un-
less the right invaded is a legal right,—one of property, one arising 
out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one 
 
187 Clarke, 479 U.S. at 395, 400 n.16 (discussing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 (2012)); see also Mank, supra note 187, at 36; Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 
GEO. L.J. 317, 318, 327–28 (2004) (observing that most, but not all, of the Court’s zone of 
interests cases have involved the APA). 
188 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163); see generally Abbe R. Gluck & 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congres-
sional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) (providing 
empirical data regarding whether congressional staff, when they draft statutes, actually 
follow the Supreme Court’s presumptions regarding how the Court assumes Congress 
legislates). 
189 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
190 Id. at 153; see also William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field:  Zone of Interests 
and Article III Standing Analysis after Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 778 (1997) 
(“The ‘zone of interests’ test was first articulated in Association of Data Processing.” (foot-
note omitted)); Mank, supra note 187, at 34–35. 
191 Mank, supra note 187, at 35–36. 
192 See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, 156, 158 (emphasizing that the standing and zone of 
interests tests do not look to the merits of a case); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure 
of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 234 (1988) (same); Gene R. Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 
CALIF. L. REV. 68, 74 (1984) (same); Mank, supra note 187, at 35 (same). 
193 306 U. S. 118 (1939). 
244 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:1 
 
founded on a statute which confers a privilege.”194  The so-called legal 
interest or legal right test confusingly combined both common law 
and statutory bases for suit.195 
Rejecting prior cases requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a “legal 
interest” because the “test goes to the merits”;196 the Data Processing 
decision clearly differentiated between the preliminary question of 
standing and the ultimate decision on the merits, stating:  “The ques-
tion of standing is different.  It concerns, apart from the ‘case’ or 
‘controversy’ test, the question whether the interest sought to be pro-
tected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to 
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee 
in question.”197  The Data Processing decision held that the plaintiffs 
had standing to sue, but remanded all merit issues to the lower courts 
to decide, stating:  “We hold that petitioners have standing to sue and 
that the case should be remanded for a hearing on the merits.”198  
The Data Processing opinion established the fundamental principle 
that standing is a threshold question separate from the ultimate deci-
sion on the merits.199 
In Data Processing, Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, which was 
joined by Justice Byron White, criticized the majority’s establishment 
of a new zone of interests test as unnecessary once a plaintiff demon-
strates constitutional standing by proving an injury in fact.200  First, 
Justice Brennan criticized the vagueness of what a plaintiff must 
prove to meet the zone of interests test.201  Second, he contended that 
 
194 Id. at 137–38; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 
1, at 920. 
195 See Fletcher, supra note 192, at 226–27; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global 
Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 920; Peter M. Seka, Note, Federal Jurisdiction—The Second 
Circuit’s Competitive Advocate Standing Theory:  Public or Private Model Theory? A Call for Choice, 
14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 185, 191–92 (1992). 
196 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. 
197 Id.; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases, supra note 1, at 921. 
198 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 158; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming 
Cases, supra note 1, at 921. 
199 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152–54, 158; see also Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global 
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200 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 167–68, 170–73 (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissent-
ing); see also Sanford A. Church, A Defense of the “Zone of Interests” Standing Test, 1983 
DUKE L.J. 447, 456–57 (1983) (discussing Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Data 
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201 Justice Brennan wrote: 
What precisely must a plaintiff do to establish that ‘the interest sought to be pro-
tected . . . is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by 
the statute’? How specific an ‘interest’ must he advance?  Will a broad, general 
claim, such as competitive interest, suffice, or must he identify a specific legally 
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the zone of interests inquiry conflated the question of standing with 
both whether a statute precludes judicial review for an issue or class 
of plaintiffs, and, also, with the merits of deciding a case.202  Thus, he 
concluded that the Court should eliminate its new zone of interests 
standard and instead only address whether a plaintiff meets the con-
stitutional standing test.203  Arguably, Justice Scalia in his Lexmark de-
cision sought to respond to the criticisms and problems with the test 
first raised in Justice Brennan’s dissent in Data Processing by clarifying 
the zone of interests doctrine and removing it from the murky realms 
of prudential standing doctrine. 
B.  Lexmark Defines the Zone of Interests as Determining Which Plaintiffs 
Congress  Intended To Have the Right to Sue 
In Lexmark, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court had treat-
ed the zone of interests test as a part of prudential standing doctrine 
in the past, but clearly stated that the test was not prudential in na-
ture.204  Instead, the Lexmark decision declared that “[w]hether a 
plaintiff comes within the zone of interests is an issue that requires us 
to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, 
whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a par-
ticular plaintiff’s claim.”205  Justice Scalia then relied upon the view of 
Judge Silberman of the D.C. Circuit that “prudential standing is a 
misnomer as applied to the zone-of-interests analysis, which asks 
whether this particular class of persons ha[s] a right to sue under this 
substantive statute.”206 
In addition to deciding that the zone of interests test is not pru-
dential in nature, the Court tried to provide more concrete direction 
on how courts should apply the test.207  The Lexmark decision ex-
plained that “the question this case presents is whether Static Control 
falls within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to 
sue under § 1125(a).  In other words, we ask whether Static Control 
 
protected interest?  When, too, is his interest ‘arguably’ within the appropriate 
‘zone’?  Does a mere allegation that it falls there suffice? 
  Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissenting); see also 
Church, supra note 200, at 456; Mank, supra note 187, at 35–36, 35 n.100. 
202 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 174–78 (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissenting); see 
also Mank, supra note 187, at 35–36. 
203 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 178 (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissenting); see also 
Church, supra note 200, at 456; Mank, supra note 187, at 36. 
204 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387. 
205 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
206 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
207 Id. at 1387–88 & n.4. 
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has a cause of action under the statute.”208  In a footnote, the Court 
rejected previous decisions suggesting that the zone of interests test 
be classified as a “statutory standing” inquiry and hence “effectively 
jurisdictional” in nature and instead reasoned that the statutory 
standing “label is an improvement over the language of ‘prudential 
standing,’ since it correctly places the focus on the statute.  But it, 
too, is misleading, since ‘the absence of a valid (as opposed to argua-
ble) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, 
i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the 
case.’”209 
Justice Scalia in Lexmark explained that the Court generally pre-
sumes that the zone of interests test governs who may sue under all 
statutes, that Congress legislates against the background of the zone 
of interests test, and that courts analyze a statute to determine which 
groups are entitled to sue under the statute.210  He also observed that 
the Court in several decisions had liberally construed the zone of in-
terests test in judicial review of administrative actions under the APA, 
but cautioned that this liberal approach was not necessarily applica-
ble to other statutory schemes.211  For example, as is discussed more 
fully in Part II.C, the Lexmark decision observed that the Lanham Act 
contains a “detailed statement of the statute’s purposes.”212  While the 
Lexmark decision did not answer every question about the zone of in-
terests test, as Part IV.C will explain about the issue of competitor 
standing,213 Justice Scalia’s opinion did partially answer Justice Bren-
nan’s complaint in his dissenting opinion in Data Processing that the 
test was so vague it should be abandoned214 by explainging that 
“[w]hether a plaintiff comes within the zone of interests is an issue 
that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory in-
terpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action en-
compasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.”215  Because his approach to 
the test involves a case by case determination of statutory intent, Jus-
 
208 Id. at 1387. 
209 Id. at 1387–88, 1387 n.4 (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 
642–43 (2002)) (citing Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 183–85 (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting)). 
210 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388–89. 
211 Id. at 1389. 
212 Id. 
213 See infra Part IV.C. 
214 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 167–78 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissent-
ing); see also Church, supra note 200, at 456–57 (discussing Justice Brennan’s dissenting 
opinion in Data Processing); Mank, supra note 187, at 35–36 (same). 
215 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); supra notes 
88–89, 90, and 205 and accompanying text. 
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tice Scalia’s approach to the zone of interests test in Lexmark is likely 
to survive even after his departure from the Court because his flexible 
methodology would enable a court to reach a desired merits outcome 
depending upon how it interprets the specific language of a statute.216  
While a future Supreme Court would probably agree with Justice 
Scalia’s Lexmark opinion that the liberal approach to interpreting the 
zone of interests in APA cases is not necessarily applicable to other 
types of statutes,217 a Court in future cases could apply a liberalized 
version of the zone of interests test in at least some non-APA cases 
without overruling the Lexmark decision.218 
C.  The Battle in the D.C. Circuit Regarding Competitor Standing 
In its Lexmark decision, the Court rejected the test used in the 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that a plaintiff must be a direct 
competitor of the defendant to sue under the Lanham Act, and in-
stead relied upon broader principles in the zone of interests test and 
proximate causation to determine which plaintiffs may sue.219  The 
Lexmark decision, however, did not directly address the broader issue 
of when competitors are within a statute’s zone of interests.  In Clarke, 
the Supreme Court clearly emphasized that competitors are usually 
within the zone of interests in APA cases to challenge a statute or 
administrative decision favoring a competitor.220  However, the D.C. 
Circuit has applied a far more restrictive approach in non-APA cases 
to determining when competitors are within the zone of interests to 
challenge a statute or administrative decision, but that strict test has 
been seriously questioned by at least one judge in that circuit.221 
 
216 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388–89. 
217 Id. at 1389. 
218 See infra Parts IV.C and Conclusion. 
219 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1385, 1391 (discussing the direct competitor test in Seventh, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits and rejecting it in favor of the broader zone of interests and proxi-
mate causation principles in assessing liability under the Lanham Act). 
220 Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 397 n.12, 403 (1987); see also Mank, supra note 
187, at 59–60. 
221 Compare White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1256–58 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (per curiam), cert. granted on other grounds sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 
(2014) (discussing how the zone of interests test is applied to competitors in D.C. Circuit, 
especially in environmental cases), with id. at 1267–73 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (criticizing D.C. Circuit’s test for whether competitors fall within 
the zone of interests as inconsistent with Supreme Court case law and internally incon-
sistent within the Circuit’s precedent). 
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1.  Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA 
Despite the Supreme Court’s declaration in Clarke that the zone of 
interests test “is not meant to be especially demanding,”222 the D.C. 
Circuit in several non-APA cases has denied standing for competitors, 
especially in environmental cases, on the grounds that their econom-
ic interests are not within the zone of interests of the relevant stat-
ute’s environmental and health purposes.223  In a 1988 decision, Haz-
ardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA,224 the D.C. Circuit distinguished 
Clarke and applied a narrow approach to competitor standing in non-
APA cases.225  The Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, a national 
trade organization of firms engaged in the treatment of hazardous 
waste and the manufacture of equipment for that purpose, petitioned 
for review of EPA’s rules concerning the burning of hazardous waste, 
including used oil, as fuel, on the grounds that they were insufficient-
ly comprehensive and stringent under the controlling statute, the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”).226  Three members 
of the Council claimed competitive injuries from the proposed EPA 
regulations on the ground “that the asserted laxity of the regulations 
will diminish the market for their high-tech control services.”227  The 
Council argued that its interests, although pecuniary, were “in sync 
with those sought to be served by [the] RCRA [statute].”228  The D.C. 
Circuit observed, “[i]n essence they suggest that tightening of envi-
ronmental standards will generally foster not only a cleaner environ-
ment but also the member companies’ profits, as it will expand the 
market for their services.”229 
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Clarke had suggested a 
generally liberal approach to applying the zone of interests test, the 
D.C. Circuit in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council interpreted Clarke as 
“somewhat unclear” in cases where a competitor argued that its pe-
cuniary interests happen to align with the environmental goals of a 
statute.230  According to the D.C. Circuit, Clarke, in applying the zone 
of interests test, had employed a balancing test by not requiring “a 
 
222 Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399. 
223 See cases discussed in Part IV.C. 
224 861 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 
225 Id. at 282–83. 
226 Id. at 279–80 (discussing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 
U.S.C. § 6901, §§ 6921–6939a). 
227 Id. at 281. 
228 Id. at 282. 
229 Id. 
230 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 282; see Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399. 
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showing of congressional intent to benefit” but by also seeking “more 
than a ‘marginal[] rela[tionship]’ to the statutory purposes.”231  Even 
“in the absence of an apparent congressional intent to benefit” a 
plaintiff, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that competitor standing 
may be appropriate where there is “some indicator that the plaintiff is 
a peculiarly suitable challenger of administrative neglect [to] sup-
port[] an inference that Congress would have intended eligibility.”232  
However, the court concluded that the Council’s competitor inter-
ests, even if they were somewhat “in sync” with the statute’s interests, 
were too “‘marginally related’ to Congress’s environmental purposes” 
to qualify for standing.233 
The D.C. Circuit in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council based its re-
strictive approach to competitor standing in non-APA cases in part on 
the assumption that prudential standing necessarily prohibited some 
parties who met Article III standing from suing, stating:  “And of 
course a rule that gave any such plaintiff standing merely because it 
happened to be disadvantaged by a particular agency decision would 
destroy the requirement of prudential standing; any party with consti-
tutional standing could sue.”234  The reasoning in the preceding sen-
tence is now highly questionable in light of Lexmark’s conclusion that 
the zone of interests test is not prudential in nature; however, the 
D.C. Circuit could still reach the same conclusion by reasoning that 
Congress, in enacting RCRA, did not intend to include competitors, 
such as the three members of the Council in Hazardous Waste Treat-
ment Council, to be among the class of plaintiffs entitled to sue.235  
Nevertheless, the Council’s “in sync” argument should have prevailed 
because competitor suits, even if self-interested, frequently serve the 
environmental goals of RCRA and other environmental statutes.236 
2.  Clean Air Act Cases 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has denied competitor standing under 
the zone of interests test in Clean Air Act (“CAA”) cases.  For exam-
ple, in its 2001 decision in Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA,237 the 
 
231 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 283 (quoting Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399 (altera-
tions in original)). 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–89 (applying the zone of interests test as to whether Con-
gress intended plaintiffs to be among class eligible to sue under a particular statute). 
236 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 282. 
237 255 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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court held that the purely economic interests of manufacturers of 
pollution control equipment seeking more rigorous regulation of 
their competitors under § 112 of the Act were not within the zone of 
interests of statute despite the argument of the industry coalition that 
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council’s denial of competitor standing did 
not apply to its suit because the CAA utilizes a technology-based ap-
proach to controlling air emissions that differs from the RCRA statute 
at issue in the former case.238  The court concluded that the technol-
ogy-based approach in the CAA did not demonstrate that Congress 
intended to broaden the zone of interests to include competitor 
standing because there was no evidence that Congress wanted every 
source to use the best pollution control equipment, but only to meet 
the performance standards of reducing air emissions, as distinct from 
adopting the methods of emission control, of the best performing 
sources.239  The D.C. Circuit concluded, “[a]s in the [Hazardous Waste 
Treatment Council] cases, the Council’s interest lies only in increasing 
the regulatory burden on others,” and, therefore, the industry com-
petitors in its case failed to meet the zone of interests test because 
they lacked any interest in the environmental health goals of the stat-
ute.240 
Likewise, in its 2013 decision in Association of Battery Recyclers v. 
EPA, the D.C. Circuit held that a corporation could not challenge the 
EPA’s failure to impose more stringent emission standards on its 
competitors because that interest fell outside the zone of interests 
protected by § 112 of the CAA—the same section at issue in Cement 
Kiln Recycling Coalition.241  The D.C. Circuit in these two CAA cases ig-
nored the value of recognizing standing for competitor suits that 
raise arguments in favor of more environmental protection even if a 
competitor is more interested in its profits than in protecting the 
public health.242  It is noteworthy that the Lexmark decision discussed 
Judge Silberman’s concurring opinion in Association of Battery Recy-
clers, and also cited a dissenting opinion by Judge Kavanaugh of the 
D.C. Circuit in Grocery Manufacturers Association v. EPA.243  The citation 
 
238 Id. at 870–71. 
239 Id. at 871; see also White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1256–57 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (discussing Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA), cert. 
granted sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014). 
240 Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition, 255 F.3d at 871. 
241 716 F.3d 667, 674 (2013) (citing Cement Kiln Recycling Coaliation, 255 F.3d at 870–71). 
242 See id.; Cement Kiln Recycling Coaliation, 255 F.3d 855 at 870–71. 
243 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–88 & nn.3–4 (citing Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 
183–85 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)) (discussing Association of Battery Recy-
clers, 716 F.3d at 675–76 (Silberman, J., concurring opinion).  In his dissenting opinion in 
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of those two cases in Lexmark suggests that the Court is aware of the 
controversy in the D.C. Circuit about the application of the zone of 
interests test to competitor standing, because both cases involved 
competitor standing in part, although the Court did not directly ad-
dress that issue.244 
3.  White Stallion Energy Center 
In White Stallion Energy Center v. EPA,245 the majority of a D.C. Cir-
cuit panel followed its precedent to deny competitor standing, but 
Judge Kavanaugh wrote a strong concurring opinion criticizing the 
D.C. Circuit’s restrictive approach to competitor standing as both in-
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and internally inconsistent 
within the Circuit’s precedent.246  Additionally, White Stallion Energy 
Center is of interest because it is one of the first cases to address the 
implications of Lexmark on the zone of interests test.247  In White Stal-
lion Energy Center, Julander Energy Company, an oil and natural gas 
development, exploration, and production company, challenged the 
EPA’s decision not to adopt stricter emission standards pursuant to § 
 
Grocery Manufacturers, Judge Kavanaugh argued that prudential standing should not be 
treated as jurisdictional in nature.  Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 181–90 (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that prudential standing should not be jurisdictional in nature, ob-
serving six circuits since 1999 have held that prudential standing is non-jurisdictional, 
discussing and arguing that the trend in the courts of appeals is to treat the issue as non-
jurisdictional).  Subsequently, Judge Silberman in his concurring opinion in Association of 
Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA implicitly disagreed with Judge Kavanaugh by suggesting that 
while prudential standing may not be jurisdictional in some instances, such as in suits in-
volving third parties, it should be jurisdictional in statutory zone of interests cases; he also 
argued that the zone of interests test was more properly classified as “statutory standing” 
rather than a form of prudential standing.  Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, 716 F.3d at 675–78 
(Silberman, J., concurring).  In White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, Judge Kavanaugh 
observed in a footnote that Lexmark had “made clear that the zone of interests test is not 
jurisdictional.”  748 F.3d 1222, 1271 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), cert. granted sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014). 
244 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–88, 1387 n.4; infra Part IV.C. 
245 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 
(2014). 
246 Compare id. at 1256–58 (discussing how zone of interests test is applied to competitors in 
D.C. Circuit, especially in environmental cases), with id. at 1267-73 (Kavanaugh, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing D.C. Circuit’s test for whether competi-
tors fall within the zone of interests as inconsistent with Supreme Court case law and in-
ternally inconsistent within the circuit’s precedent).  Judge Kavanaugh dissented 
regarding the majority’s holding that the EPA did not have to consider cost in setting 
emission standards pursuant to § 112 of the Clean Air Act.  Id. at 1258–66. 
247 Compare id. at 1256 (arguing Lexmark is consistent with D.C. Circuit’s approach to compet-
itor standing) with id. at 1272 (arguing Lexmark is inconsistent with D.C. Circuit’s ap-
proach to competitor standing). 
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112 of the Clean Air Act by requiring “fuel switching” by electric utili-
ty steam generating units (“EGUs”) from coal to natural gas.248  After 
concluding that Julander met the three-part Article III constitutional 
standing requirements, the D.C. Circuit next addressed the EPA’s 
contention that Julander did not come within the zone of interests 
test.249 
While acknowledging that the Supreme Court in Clarke had de-
clared that the zone of interests test “‘is not meant to be especially 
demanding,’”250 the D.C. Circuit nevertheless concluded that in light 
of its precedent in two § 112 CAA cases, Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition 
and Association of Battery Recyclers, as well as the broader principles in 
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, it must hold that Julander was out-
side the zone of interests protected by § 112.251  Rejecting Judge Ka-
vanaugh’s argument that the Circuit’s cases on competitor standing 
were internally inconsistent and therefore a “‘coin flip’” about which 
precedents to follow, the majority relied upon Lexmark for the princi-
ple that “‘the breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the 
provisions of law at issue.’”252 The D.C. Circuit then explained that it 
must be guided by its precedents interpreting § 112, and not those 
applying other statutory provisions, including the APA. Because two § 
112 CAA cases in the D.C. Circuit, Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition and 
Association of Battery Recyclers, had already denied standing to competi-
tors seeking more stringent emission standards under § 112, the ma-
jority believed it was bound by circuit precedent to deny standing in 
its case.253  Rejecting Judge Kavanaugh’s argument that a recent Su-
preme Court decision had undermined the D.C. Circuit’s strict inter-
pretation of the zone of interests test, the majority responded, “[t]his 
court has not read the Supreme Court’s decision in Match–E–Be–
Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak254 . . . to change 
the zone of interests standard.255 
Judge Kavanaugh “reluctantly” concurred with the portion of the 
majority opinion concluding that Julander did not come within the 
zone of interests test; he argued that the D.C. Circuit’s precedent was 
 
248 Id. at 1256. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. (quoting Clarke v. Secs. Indus., 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)). 
251 Id. at 1256–58. 
252 Id. at 1256 (quoting Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389 (citation omitted)). 
253 Id. at 1256–58 (citing Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2012); id. 
at 180 (Tatel, J., concurring) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit court is bound to follow its 
own precedent). 
254 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012). 
255 White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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inconsistent regarding competitor standing and, therefore, “[g]iven 
that our case law makes this issue a de facto coin flip, I cannot fault 
an opinion that lands on heads rather than tails.”256  He contended, 
however, that “our cases holding that competitors are outside the 
zone of interests—including today’s decision—are inconsistent with 
the governing Supreme Court precedents.”257  Judge Kavanaugh ar-
gued that the Supreme Court in Clarke had explicitly rejected the 
D.C. Circuit’s narrow approach to competitor standing in APA 
suits.258  Despite Clarke, the D.C. Circuit in non-APA cases such as 
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council continued to bar competitors from 
suing on the ground that they are outside the zone of interests.259  
Judge Kavanaugh maintained that the Hazardous Waste Treatment 
Council decision wrongly required competitors to provide “‘explicit 
evidence of [a statutory] intent to benefit such firms, or some reason 
to believe that such firms would be unusually suitable champions of 
Congress’s ultimate goals.’”260  He responded: 
In my view, that language in Hazardous Waste is difficult to square with 
what the Supreme Court said in Clarke and earlier cases.  In those cases, 
the Supreme Court had specifically said that there does not need to be ev-
idence of an intent to benefit the plaintiff class.  In fact, the Supreme 
Court said that suit should be allowed unless there was a discernible con-
gressional intent to preclude suit by the plaintiff class.  In other words, this 
Court’s cases seemingly flipped the presumption in favor of allowing suit 
by competitor plaintiffs to a presumption against allowing suit by compet-
itor plaintiffs.261 
Judge Kavanaugh convincingly argued that the Hazardous Waste 
decision is inconsistent with the Clarke decision’s presumption in fa-
vor of competitor suits unless there is evidence in a particular statute 
that Congress did not wish to allow such suits. 
Judge Kavanaugh argued that the majority was wrong to apply a 
stricter approach to the zone of interests test for Clean Air Act cases 
than the lenient “default rule” favoring competitor suits in APA cases 
in Clarke and similar Supreme Court decisions because no language 
in the CAA suggested that Congress wanted to bar competitor suits.262  
Judge Kavanaugh emphasized the Court’s 2012 decision in Match–
 
256 Id. at 1267 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 1268–72. 
259 Id. at 1269–71. 
260 Id. (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 283). 
261 White Stallion Energy Center, 748 F.3d at 1269–71 (footnote omitted). 
262 Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
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E,263 an APA case that did not involve competitor standing, where the 
Court: 
[R]eaffirmed—in line with Data Processing and Clarke—that the plaintiff 
need not be among a class that Congress intended to benefit in the stat-
ute at hand. And Match–E further reaffirmed that a wide variety of inter-
ests, including economic interests related to the agency’s allegedly unlaw-
ful action with respect to someone else, fall within the zone of interests.264 
He reasoned, “Given its music and its words, Match–E should have 
put a final end to this Court’s crabbed approach to the zone of inter-
ests test.”265  He concluded: 
[O]ur current zone of interests case law is inconsistent and unpredicta-
ble. Perhaps most troubling, our cases holding that competitors are out-
side the zone of interests are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, 
as I read it. In my respectful view, too much is at stake in the administra-
tive process, for health, safety, and environmental regulation, and for the 
economic interests affected by these cases for us to continue muddling 
along in this way. This state of affairs should receive a careful examina-
tion at some point in the near future. Whether a party can sue in court to 
challenge illegal agency action on such important matters should not 
come down to the equivalent of a coin flip. We can do better.266 
The White Stallion majority, however, would reason to the contrary 
that the Clean Air Act favors reducing pollution to required limits, 
but does not necessarily support using the most expensive equipment 
to do so, which is usually the purpose of competitor suits.267  Also, the 
majority disagreed with Judge Kavanaugh’s assumption that lenient 
APA zone of interests cases establish a “default rule” for all cases, ex-
cept where Congress explicitly bars competitor suits; the majority 
would instead require courts to analyze the language of each statute 
in determining the scope of the zone of interests, including whether 
competitors may sue.268  Finally, the majority did not believe that the 
Match–E decision changed the D.C. Circuit’s restrictive approach to 
competitor suits in non-APA zone of interests cases.269  The majority’s 
view that a different and stricter approach to the zone of interests 
may apply in some non-APA cases is arguably consistent with Justice 
Scalia’s observation in Lexmark that the liberal approach to the zone 
of interests test in APA cases was not necessarily applicable to other 
 
263 Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 
(2012). 
264 White Stallion Energy Center, 748 F.3d at 1272 (emphasis in original). 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 1272–73. 
267 Id. at 1256–57. 
268 Id. at 1256–58. 
269 Id. at 1257. 
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statutory schemes.270  However, from a policy perspective, allowing 
competitor suits that are “in sync” with the public health goals of a 
statute would advance the statute’s purposes and, therefore, courts 
should allow competitor standing in at least environmental cases.271 
A 2014 Arizona district court decision that relied upon Lexmark in 
denying zone of interests standing for economic injuries in a Nation-
al Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)272 case is consistent with the 
White Stallion majority’s approach denying competitor standing in 
many environmental cases in the D.C. Circuit.273  In Yount v. Salazar, 
the district court had initially concluded that plaintiffs with economic 
interests in uranium mining had standing to challenge a twenty-year 
government moratorium on uranium mining near the Grand Canyon 
because their economic interests were within the zone of interests of 
NEPA, but the government asked the district court to reconsider its 
decision in light of Lexmark’s new approach to the zone of interests 
test.274  “Given Lexmark’s focus on legislative intent and the exclusively 
environmental purposes of NEPA,” the district court concluded that 
the plaintiffs’ economic interests in mining were not within the zone 
of interests of a purely environmental statute.275  Similar to the D.C. 
Circuit, the Arizona district court decision ignored the value of com-
petitors making arguments that advance environmental goals even if 
the competitor has pecuniary reasons for raising those goals. 
As a matter of policy, Judge Kavanaugh convincingly argued that 
competitor suits seeking stricter regulation of air emissions are con-
gruent with the Act’s general goal of reducing pollution.276  The “in 
sync” arguments by the competitors in Hazardous Waste Treatment 
Council made a persuasive rationale for sometimes allowing competi-
tor suits even if they are based on self-interest.277  Accordingly, at least 
in environmental cases, courts should recognize competitor standing 
as within the zone of interests unless a statute implicitly or explicitly 
forbids such suits. 
Despite Judge Kavanaugh’s strong concurring opinion in White 
Stallion Energy Center, the D.C. Circuit may decline to clarify its appli-
 
270 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389. 
271 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 282. 
272 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. 
273 Yount v. Salazar, No. CV11–8171 PCT–DGV, 2014 WL 4904423, at *4–7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 
2014). 
274 Id. at *2–6. 
275 Id. at *6–7. 
276 White Stallion Energy Center, 748 F.3d at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
277 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 282. 
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cation of the zone of interests test in non-APA cases and continue to 
address the issue on a statute by statute basis.  First, the majority in 
White Stallion and the district court in Yount both made plausible, if 
ultimately unconvincing, arguments that the mere economic interests 
of competitors are not within the zone of interests of at least some 
environmental statutes.278  Furthermore, lower courts may arguably 
resist adopting a lenient rule for competitors seeking to establish that 
they are within the zone of interests because courts frequently invoke 
standing and zone of interests barriers to dismiss cases that present 
substantive problems.279  Additionally, clarifying the zone of interests 
test may be difficult in light of the wide differences in statutory lan-
guage and individual factual circumstances in each case.280  It is nota-
ble that the Lexmark decision did not adopt a categorical test for 
competitor standing, but instead carefully analyzed the facts of the 
case in light of the Lanham Act’s stated purposes and broader zone 
of interests and proximate causation principles.281 
However, a future Supreme Court might apply a more liberal ap-
proach to interpreting the zone of interests in non-APA competitor 
suits as it already does in APA cases because the burden of hearing 
such cases largely falls on the lower courts.282  Furthermore, at least in 
 
278 White Stallion Energy Center, 748 F.3d at 1256–58; Yount, 2014 WL 4904423. 
279 David LaRoss, Despite Judge’s Call, Courts Unlikely To Clarify Key Industry ‘Standing’ Test, 
INSIDEEPA.COM (May 30, 2014), http://insideepa.com/201405302472576/EPA-Daily-
News/Daily-News/despite-judges-call-courts-unlikely-to-clarify-key-industry-standing-
test/menu-id-95.html?s=mu  (subscription required) (reporting that an attorney com-
menting on the White Stallion Energy Center decision and the zone of interests issue in that 
case observed that the D.C. Circuit “see[s] a lot of administrative [law] cases, and they 
don’t want to deal with the merits of them all the time. . . . In a difficult case where they 
don’t want to reach the merits, they can just say ‘let’s deal with this on standing.’”).  Be-
cause of its discretionary certiorari authority to deny review of cases, the Supreme Court 
usually does not face the same pressure as lower courts to manipulate standing doctrine 
to avoid deciding cases.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Make Sense of Supreme Court Standing 
Cases—A Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 105, 125 (2014). 
280 See LaRoss, supra note 279 (arguing “[f]ederal courts are not likely to clarify the applica-
tion of the so-called ‘zone of interest’ test that plaintiffs, especially industry plaintiffs, 
must meet to show standing when they sue over actions by EPA and other agencies” be-
cause each case presents unique issues that make it difficult to develop a uniform zone of 
interests test for industry competitors). 
281 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1385 (discussing direct competitor test in Seventh, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits); id. at 1389 (“Identifying the interests protected by the Lanham Act, how-
ever, requires no guesswork, since the Act includes an ‘unusual, and extraordinarily help-
ful,’ detailed statement of the statute’s purposes.”); id. at 1391–95 (rejecting direct com-
petitor test for broader zone of interests and proximate causation principles in assessing 
liability under the Lanham Act). 
282 While more than 10,000 cases are on the Supreme Court’s docket each year, the Court 
grants plenary review, with oral arguments by attorneys, in only about 100 cases per term. 
The Justices’ Caseload, Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
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environmental cases, there is a strong argument that competitor suits 
are often “in sync” with the pollution reduction goals of the statute 
even if a competitor is self-interested.283  Finally, allowing competitor 
suits in non-APA cases arguably would not require the Court to ex-
plicitly overrule the case by case approach to the zone of interests test 
in the Lexmark decision.284 
V.  THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND RELATED ISSUES:  PRUDENTIAL 
STANDING OR SOMETHING ELSE? 
In Lexmark, Justice Scalia acknowledged that “limitations on third-
party standing are harder to classify.”285  In a few cases, the Court had 
“observed that third-party standing is closely related to the question 
whether a person in the litigant’s position will have a right of action 
on the claim.”286  However, “most” of the Court’s cases had treated 
the usual limitation on third-party suits as related to prudential stand-
ing.287  Because third-party standing was not an issue in Lexmark, Jus-
tice Scalia concluded that “consideration of that doctrine’s proper 
place in the standing firmament can await another day.”288  If he has 
the same negative views about prudential standing expressed in his 
1983 law review article,289 Justice Scalia probably would prefer to see 
third-party standing limitations treated as ‘whether a person in the 
litigant’s position will have a right of action on the claim,” but pre-
sumably he could not convince his colleagues to eliminate the last 
major prong of prudential standing.290 
A brief discussion of the reasons for limitations on third-party 
standing and the exceptions to that doctrine might illuminate at least 
some of the pitfalls facing the Court if it decides to address the ra-
tionale for that doctrine in a future case.  In most, but not all cases, 
 
about/justicecaseload.aspx.  The Court writes formal written opinions in eighty to ninety 
cases each year.  Id.  Additionally, the Court disposes of approximately fifty to sixty cases 
each term without granting plenary review.  Id. 
283 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 861 F.2d at 282. 
284 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388–89 (citing precedent to support a case by case approach of 
determining the “range of interests” encompassed by the zone of interests test). 
285 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3. 
286 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
287 Id. (citing, for example, Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128–29 (2004) and suggesting 
that the limitation on third-party suits is an element of “prudential standing”)). 
288 Id. 
289 Scalia, supra note 4, at 885 (criticizing prudential standing doctrine as unnecessary addi-
tion to Article III standing principles); Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing, 
supra note 1, at 106–07 (discussing Justice Scalia’s 1983 article’s criticism of prudential 
standing doctrine). 
290 Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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the Court has adopted the rule that a party “‘generally must assert his 
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on 
the legal rights or interests of third parties.’”291  The Court has ex-
plained this rule as assuming that “the party with the right has the 
appropriate incentive to challenge (or not challenge) governmental 
action and to do so with the necessary zeal and appropriate presenta-
tion,” but that third parties are more likely to raise “‘abstract ques-
tions of wide public significance’” that are better addressed by “‘other 
governmental institutions’” than the federal courts.292 
The Court has allowed exceptions to the general limitation on 
third-party standing in some constitutional cases involving fundamen-
tal rights.293 However, the Court has limited those exceptions “by re-
quiring that a party seeking third-party standing make two additional 
showings.  First, we have asked whether the party asserting the right 
has a ‘close’ relationship with the person who possesses the right.  Se-
cond, we have considered whether there is a ‘hindrance’ to the pos-
sessor’s ability to protect his own interests.’”294  In cases involving First 
Amendment and other important constitutional rights, the Court has 
been especially willing to allow third-party suits, but in non-
constitutional areas of law, the Court has been much less willing to do 
so.295 
If reclassifying limitations on third-party standing from prudential 
standing to some other constitutional or non-constitutional test for 
reviewability changed the underlying substance of which third parties 
may sue, there would likely be resistance from some members of the 
Court.  For example, if the Court were to change its current prefer-
ence for allowing third parties to defend First Amendment rights it 
would arguably be more difficult to find plaintiffs willing to challenge 
questionable laws restricting free speech rights.  In Secretary of State of 
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., the Court allowed a fundraising 
professional to challenge Maryland’s 25% limit on fundraising ex-
penses for charitable organizations on First Amendment grounds de-
spite Maryland’s argument that the affected charities could sue di-
rectly rather than rely on the third-party fundraiser.296  The Court 
 
291 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, partially 
abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377). 
292 Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377). 
293 Id. at 129–30; Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing Of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 95, 147–49 (2014). 
294 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130 (citation omitted) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 
(1991)); see also Garrett, supra note 294, at 147–49. 
295 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130 (citing several cases). 
296 467 U.S. 947, 955–58 (1984). 
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emphasized the value to public discourse pursuant to the First 
Amendment rights in allowing a third party to sue: 
Facial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for 
the benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society—to prevent the 
statute from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not be-
fore the court.  Munson’s ability to serve that function has nothing to do 
with whether or not its own First Amendment rights are at stake.  The 
crucial issues are whether Munson satisfies the requirement of “injury-in-
fact,” and whether it can be expected satisfactorily to frame the issues in 
the case.297 
The Court would be understandably reluctant to reject Munson’s 
rationale for allowing third-party suits and make it more difficult to 
bring future First Amendment challenges because it reclassified how 
it characterizes third-party suits from flexible prudential considera-
tions to some other constitutional or non-constitutional grounds that 
are less flexible in allowing third-party challenges.  Similarly, in the 
controversial area of abortion law, the Court has allowed physicians 
to sue as third parties on behalf of their patients who seek abor-
tions.298  In the area of racial discrimination and civil rights law, the 
Court has allowed white plaintiffs to challenge racially restrictive 
property covenants that exclude black property purchasers299 or the 
exclusion of blacks from juries.300  In a gender discrimination case, 
the Court in Craig v. Boren held a liquor store owner could challenge 
a state law that allowed women to purchase low-alcohol beer at age 
eighteen, but forbade males from purchasing such beer until age 
twenty-one.301  The Court is understandably reluctant to change how 
it classifies or treats third-party suits without a full understanding of 
the implications in a wide variety of cases. 
 
297 Id. at 958. 
298 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117–18 (1976) (holding physicians have standing to sue 
on behalf of their patients for right to an abortion because direct suits by patients might 
risk public disclosure of their procreation decisions). 
299 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257–60 (1953) (holding white property owner who was 
sued for selling his land to an African-American buyer in violation of a racially restrictive 
covenant can raise defense that the covenant violates the civil rights of the third-party Af-
rican-American buyer). 
300 Powers, 499 U.S. at 411–15 (holding white criminal defendant could argue blacks were 
excluded from his jury in violation of their equal protection rights from allegedly race-
based peremptory challenges during juror selection). 
301 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192–97 (1976) (holding liquor vendor had standing to rep-
resent third-party men between the ages of eighteen to twenty to challenge a state law 
that allowed women to drink 3.2% beer at age eighteen, but forbade males from that beer 
until age twenty-one, both because the state did not challenge her standing in the lower 
courts and because she faced significant risk of sanctions, including the possible loss of 
her liquor sales license, if she sold beer to men between the ages of eighteen through 
twenty). 
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A possible solution to the issue of whether third-party suits are ap-
propriate would be to recognize that at least some of the plaintiffs in 
such cases have a sufficient derivative interest to have a personal and 
concrete Article III standing injury, but such a rule would work in on-
ly some circumstances and not others.302  The Court has already re-
quired that third parties seeking to assert the constitutional rights of 
a first party demonstrate a sufficient injury in fact to themselves from 
the asserted constitutional injury such as a doctor asserting the con-
stitutional rights of a patient whose practice and professional rela-
tionship with that patient would be affected by the denial of the con-
stitutional right.303  For example, as the Court recognized in Craig, the 
liquor store owner faced significant sanctions, including the potential 
loss of her liquor license if she sold beer to males between the ages of 
eighteen to twenty.304  The Court in future cases could expand that 
rationale to include loss of sales to such men and accordingly recog-
nize that the liquor license holder would suffer an economic injury in 
fact sufficient for standing in her own right. 
However, the Court possibly might prefer to retain the current 
third-party standing rationale because it focuses more on the consti-
tutional rights lost by the first party whose constitutional rights are 
arguably being infringed than on economic injuries that primarily af-
fect the third party.305  For instance, there is an argument that corpo-
rations should not be allowed to assert third-party standing for fun-
damental constitutional rights affecting their employees or 
customers, even if the corporation has an economic interest, because 
rights such as the right against self-incrimination are inherently indi-
vidual and should not be delegated to or interfered with by a corpo-
ration since the government may prosecute the individual separately 
from the corporation and sentence the individual to prison if he is 
convicted.306  The Court arguably could limit or even abolish third-
party standing if it took a broader view of when derivative injuries are 
 
302 See Brown, supra note 33, at 131–32 (suggesting that some third-party suits based on de-
rivative injuries could be recognized as sufficient for personal Article III injury). 
303 See Garrett, supra note 294, at 148; see also HomeAway Inc. v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, 2015 WL 367121, at *6 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015) (“Some cases list a third re-
quirement for prudential third-party standing, that the plaintiff itself has suffered (or will 
suffer) an injury, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 410–11, while others treat that as a separate ques-
tion of whether the plaintiff has Article III standing, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 
[125,] [] 129 [(2004)].”). 
304 Craig, 429 U.S. at 192–97. 
305 See Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129–30 (discussing general limitation of third-party standing to 
cases involving fundamental constitutional rights); Garrett, supra note 293, at 147–49 
(same). 
306 Garrett, supra note 294, at 148–53. 
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sufficient for a personal Article III standing injury to sue.307  However, 
one must acknowledge that third-party rights cases involve a wide 
range of factual circumstances and that one rule will not fit all cas-
es.308 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia has partially achieved the goal announced in his 
1983 law review article of eliminating prudential standing doctrine 
because of his view that constitutional Article III standing require-
ments are the only permissible jurisdictional limitation that can be 
imposed by the judiciary on suits in federal courts and that any at-
tempt to add additional flexible judicially crafted prudential consid-
erations to bar otherwise constitutional suits raises concerns of judi-
cial activism.309  In other words, if a litigant meets Article III standing 
requirements, no judicial barrier should stand in the way of his suit, 
although Congress might limit who may sue.310  Accordingly, the 
Lexmark decision’s reclassification of the limitation on generalized 
grievances as arising from Article III constitutional grounds and not 
prudential considerations is a significant victory for Justice Scalia’s 
theory of standing.311  However, the Court has not yet explicitly fol-
lowed Justice Scalia’s argument in his concurring opinion in Hein 
that the prohibition against taxpayer suits is a mandatory constitu-
tional barrier.312 
Despite Justice Scalia’s apparent victory against prudential stand-
ing in Lexmark, a future Supreme Court changed by retirements and 
new appointments might revive the prudential implications of the 
Flast decision or overrule its decision in Arizona Christian School Tui-
tion Organization without overruling the Lexmark decision.313  Moreo-
ver, there is still the question of what constitutes a generalized griev-
ance and it is less likely that Lexmark’s reclassification of generalized 
grievances would cause those Justices who were in the majority in 
 
307 See generally Brown, supra note 33, at 131–32 (suggesting that some third-party suits based 
on derivative injuries could be recognized as sufficient for personal Article III injury). 
308 Brown, supra note 33, at 130–31. 
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standing doctrine). 
311 See supra Parts II.B, III.A–B. 
312 See supra Part III.A. 
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Akins or Massachusetts, which respectively allowed voter suits and cli-
mate change suits despite arguments that such suits were generalized 
grievances, to agree with Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Akins 
or Chief Justice Robert’s dissenting opinion in Massachusetts to bar 
standing in similar cases.314  Accordingly, the Lexmark decision’s re-
classification of generalized grievances as being generally barred by 
Article III rather than prudential considerations may have a less sig-
nificant impact on substantive decisions than Justice Scalia would 
hope.315 
Justice Scalia was also successful in reclassifying the zone of inter-
ests test as regarding which plaintiffs Congress intends to have the 
right to sue pursuant to a particular statute rather than a type of pru-
dential consideration.316  Because his interpretation of the zone of in-
terests test is flexible and depends upon the specific language of a 
statute, a future Supreme Court is unlikely to find a need to redefine 
the test as involving prudential standing because the Court could 
reach whatever merits conclusion it desired within the confines of 
Justice Scalia’s approach to the test.317  However, the Court will con-
front difficult questions about defining the scope of the test.  Even 
though Clarke and other Court decisions take a lenient approach to 
defining the zone for plaintiffs in APA cases, the D.C. Circuit has of-
ten adopted a strict approach to denying competitor standing in non-
APA cases, especially in environmental cases.318  Despite Judge Ka-
vanaugh’s strong concurring opinion in White Stallion Energy Center, it 
remains to be seen whether the en banc D.C. Circuit or the Supreme 
Court will re-examine cases denying competitor suits in non-APA cas-
es as outside the zone of interests or whether it is possible to adopt a 
consistent rule at all when the language of each statute varies consid-
erably.319  At least in environmental cases, there is a strong argument 
that competitor suits are frequently “in sync” with the anti-pollution 
goals of the statute even if the competitor sues only for reasons of 
self-interest.320  A future Supreme Court could apply its liberal ap-
proach to interpreting the zone of interests in APA cases to at least 
some competitor suits outside the scope of the APA without overrul-
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ing the Lexmark decision’s approach of interpreting each statute ac-
cording to its particular language.321 
Finally, although Justice Scalia conceded that “limitations on 
third-party standing are harder to classify,” that question was not an 
issue in Lexmark and, therefore, the Court did not address the issue.322  
He did point out that some Court decisions had apparently treated 
the question as a non-prudential issue, but acknowledged that other 
decisions had addressed the issue as a prudential matter.323  While the 
Court is often strict in denying third-party standing, it has created ex-
ceptions in areas such as First Amendment challenges, abortion, and 
racial or gender discrimination issues.324  The Court may be reluctant 
to reclassify the general limitation on third-party suits from pruden-
tial in nature to some other constitutional or non-constitutional rule 
until it more fully understands the implications for its cases that allow 
third parties to challenge restrictions on free speech, race, gender, or 
abortions.325  The Court should not impair fundamental constitution-
al rights such as free speech to achieve more uniform standing rules 
that eliminate third-party standing.326  The Court should strongly con-
sider treating some heretofore derivative third-party injuries such as 
economic losses as sufficient for a personal and concrete injury for 
the plaintiff to sue as a first party rather than a third party; however, 
corporations arguably should not have standing to sue in ways that 
are detrimental to their employees or customers.327  Third-party 
standing cases often involve complicated individual constitutional 
rights issues that cannot be reduced to a single simple standing 
rule.328 
Like most important Supreme Court decisions, the Lexmark deci-
sion’s changing of some prudential standing rules and classifications 
answers some questions, but leaves many for another day.  Because 
there were no concurring opinions in Lexmark, it is difficult to know 
to whether all members of the Court will completely join Justice Scal-
ia’s approach in his 1983 law review article of eliminating prudential 
doctrines and applying only the constitutional Article III standing test 
in determining justiciability.329  Perhaps Justice Scalia has won half the 
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battle by at least convincing the Court to reconsider the entire issue 
of whether federal judges should have prudential authority to dismiss 
cases where plaintiffs have constitutional standing.  Yet because 
Lexmark does not explicitly bar all consideration of prudential factors 
by federal courts, a future Supreme Court might subtly reject Justice 
Scalia’s strict Article III standing methodology in taxpayer, climate 
change, third-party, voter rights, or competitor suits without overrul-
ing his majority decision.330 
 
330 See supra Parts III and V. 
